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PRISONERS' RIGHTS
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime
and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of
any country.2
1. INTRODUCTION
Another epidemic has hit the international community. This one, however,
is not derived from an unknown bacterial agent. Instead, it originates from
a variety of social agents. The epidemic? The explosion in the number of
people incarcerated in the global community.3 As of June 1997, the United
States' prison4 population exceeded 1,700,000. 5 This figure is consistent
with the United States' status as one of the world's largest jailers.6 Like the
2 19 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1354 (1910) (statement by Sir Winston Churchill).
3 For the purposes of this Article, the term "global community" is limited to the United
States and Europe. "Europe," as referred to herein, is defined as countries that are members
of the Council of Europe [hereinafter "the Council"]. The Council is a regional intergovern-
mental public international organization that was formed in 1949 after World War 11. A.
REYNAUD, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRISON (1986) 14 n.1; MARK W. JANIS
ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (1995) 19. The organization's multiple goals include
addressing the rights of the incarcerated. See infra pp. 21-22. Presently, the Council is
composed of 40 member states: Belgium; Denmark; France; Greece; Ireland; Italy;
Luxembourg; the Netherlands; Norway; Sweden; the United Kingdom; Iceland; Turkey;
Germany; Austria; Cyprus; Switzerland; Malta; Portugal; Spain; Liechtenstein; San Marino;
Finland; Hungary; Poland; Bulgaria; Estonia; Lithuania; Slovenia; Czech Republic; Slovakia;
Romania; Andorra; Latvia; Albania; Moldova; Macedonia; Ukraine; Russia; and Croatia. See
Tarcisio Gazzini, Considerations on the Conflict in Chechnya, 17 HuM. RTS. L.J. 93, 234
(1996); Jorg Polakiewicz, The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights in
Domestic Law, 17 HUM. RTS. L.J. 401, 403 (1996).
4 The term "prison" as used here includes jails and prisons in states, the federal
government, and the District of Columbia. However, this Article focuses on state prison
facilities. Prisons typically confine individuals convicted of an offense with a prison sentence
that exceeds one year. If the sentence is one year or less, then these convicted individuals
usually remain incarcerated at the local or county jail. Jails also house pretrial detainees,
individuals who are waiting for the disposition of their case.
5 See'Stan C. Proband, 1.7 Million in Prison and Jail at Mid-year '97, OVERCROWDED
TIMES, Feb. 1998, at 2 (citing U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics); Prison Population Rises at
Slower Pace, CORRECTIONS ALERT, Jan. 26, 1998, at 7 (noting that as of June 30, 1997 the
combined prison and jail populations in the U.S. exceed 1.7 million).
6 See United States and Russia Lead the World in Incarceration Rates, CORRECTIONS
ALERT, June 30, 1997, at 1.
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United States, Europe's prison population has escalated.7 The growth in
France's prison population is representative of the epidemic's trans-Atlantic
scope.' As of January 1995, France imprisoned 51,623 people.9 Only one
year earlier the prison population in France numbered 50,240 individuals.'l
These statistics from both sides of the Atlantic are startling and provide
a basis for concern. Numerous reasons have been proffered to explain this
global penal crisis. An important one frequently given by American and
French officials is that the enactment of stringent legislation aimed at
fighting the "War on Drugs"" has led to an increase in the number of
7 See IMPRISONMENT: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 84 (John Muncie & Richard Sparks eds.,
1991) (observing how "the overall prison population of Europe is consistently expanding");
Kristel Beyens, Overcrowding Getting Worse in Belgium, OVERCROWDED TIMES, June 1997,
at 1 (discussing the increase in Belgium's incarceration rate); Peter J.P. Tak & Anton M. Van
Kalmthout, Prison Population Growing Faster in the Netherlands than in U.S., OVERCROWD-
ED TIMES, June 1998, at I (noting that "Itihe Dutch prison population is among the fastest
growing in the world."); Pierre Tournier, French Prisons, European Prisons, PENAL ISSUES:
RESEARCH ON CRIME & JUSTICE IN FRANCE (Centre de Recherches Sociologiques sur le Droit
et les Institutions Prnales (CESDIP Paris, Fr.), 1994, at 3 (noting an overall rise in the
number of prisoners in Europe) [hereinafter Tournier, French Prisons]; Claude Faugeron,
Prisons in France: Stalemate or Evolution? in IMPRISONMENT TODAY AND TOMORROW:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND PRISON CONDITIONS, 249, 271
(Dirk van Zyl Smit & Frieder Dunkel eds., 1991) [hereinafter Faugeron, Prisons in France];
Marie-Daniele Barre, Criminal Statistics: International Comparisons, PENAL ISSUES:
RESEARCH ON CRIME & JUSTICE IN FRANCE, (CESDIP, Paris, Fr.) 1992, at 3; Motion for a
Recommendation, Eur. Consult. Ass., 44th Sess., Doc. No. 6775, at para. 1 (1993); Andr6
Kuhn, Imprisonment Trends in Western Europe, OVERCROWDED TIMES, Feb. 1996, at 1, 4-9;
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PENOLOGICAL INFORMATION BULLETIN, (Dec. 1994-1995), at 69-77;
Pierre Tournier, The Custodial Crisis in Europe Address at the Fourth Colloquium on Crime
and Criminal Policy in Europe, Centre de Recherches Sociologiques sur le Droit et les
Institutions Pdnales ("CESDIP") (Lausanne, Switzerland, September 14-16, 1994).
8 See Faugeron, Prisons in France, supra note 7, at 249 (noting that France's incarcera-
tion rate is among the highest in Europe); Annie Kensey & Pierre Tournier, Factors Leading
to Prison Population Inflation in France, Address Before the American Society of Criminology
(Chicago, Illinois, Nov. 22, 1996); Tournier, French Prisons, supra note 7, at 3.
9 See Letter from Pierre Tournier, Centre de Recherches Socioloques sur le Droit et les
Institutions Pdnales, to Roberta M. Harding, Associate Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky, (Oct. 31, 1995) (stating that as of January 1, 1995 France incarcerated 51,623
people) (on file with author).
'o See id.
" See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1; Tournier, French Prisons,
supra note 7, at 3; see also Marc Mauer, Russia, United States World Leaders in Incarcera-
tion, OVERCROWDED TIMES, Oct. 1994, at 1, 10; Prisoners in 1996, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
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people incarcerated for drug related offenses. The "get tough on crime"
political regimes that exist in these two nations have also contributed to this
expansion. For example, the institution of longer sentences and the
correlative tightening of parole eligibility policies 12 are two of the "get
tough on crime" measures that have produced swollen prison populations.
As a result of these directives, more people enter the system, remain there
for longer periods of time, and fewer are released. The increase in the
incarceration rate in France and in other European countries is also partially
attributed to the implementation of tougher national immigration policies.
13
The rights afforded to detainees and their status are effected by the rising
prison populations. Examining the history of the evolution of the rights of
prisoners in the United States and Europe will assist in identifying different
methodologies used to address these issues which subsequently can be
STATISTICS BULLETIN, (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.) June 1997, at I (noting that
the increase in the prison population between 1985 and 1995 is partially due to "an overall
increase in the percentage held for drug offenses"); see also Recommendation 1257 on the
conditions of detention in Council of Europe member states, EUR. PARL. ASS. TEXTS
ADOPTED, 1995 Sess., at para. 2 (Feb. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Recommendation 1257] (noting
an increase in drug related crimes and longer prison sentences which has led to a sharp rise
in the prison population).
12 See Mauer, supra note 11, at 10. Faugeron, Prisons in France, supra note 7, at 252-53;
Tournier, French Prisons, supra note 7, at 3-4; Letter from Martine Herzog-Evans, Lecturer
in Law, University of Paris-X, Nanterre, France, to Roberta M. Harding, Associate Professor,
University of Kentucky College of Law (July 22, 1995) (on file with author); Recommenda-
tion 1257, supra note 11, at 2; Jacques Toubon, Address in Marly-le-Roi, France (Oct. 25-27,
1996), in MONITORING PRISON CONDITIONS IN EUROPE: REPORT OF A EUROPEAN SEMINAR
at 23 [hereinafter MONITORING PRISON CONDITIONS] (commenting on how the imposition of
longer sentences has contributed towards the increase in Europe's prison population); Claude
Faugeron, A Few Questions On the Monitoring Of the Conditions Of Detention, Address in
Marly-le-Roi, France (Oct. 25-27, 1996), in MONITORING PRISON CONDITIONS, supra, at 83
n.2; see also, Tak & Van Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 13-14 (commenting on the trend of
increasing the duration of prison sentences).
13 See Faugeron, Prisons in France, supra note 7, at 253; Interview with Pierre Tournier,
(CESDIP, Paris, France) (March 16, 1995); Beyens, supra note 7, at 12 (discussing how the
rise in the number of incarcerated foreigners is partially responsible for the overall increase
in the prison population); see also MICHAEL TONRY, ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION:
COMPARATIVE AND CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (1997); Michael Tonry, Ethnicity, Crime,
and Immigration, 8 OVERCROWDED TIMES, April 1997, at 1 (discussing the impact
immigration policies have on arrest and incarceration rates in European countries).
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explored and contrasted. 4 In the context of prisoners' rights, the time is
ripe to engage in this comparative dialogue as an epidemic of this magnitude
has serious ramifications. 5  Examining, comparing, and contrasting the
manner by which prisoners' rights have developed in the respective jurisdic-
tions might assist in the "desperate search for instances of good practice
which could help politicians and penal administrators find a solution to
current ills' 16 that are the consequences of a burgeoning prison population.
The Article is divided into several sections. The first section has
subsections that explore and compare the historical development of prisoners'
rights in the respective jurisdictions. 17 Thus, each era of the evolution of
the rights of the incarcerated in the United States will be identified,
described, and discussed. The section devoted to the development of the
rights of the incarcerated in Europe contains a brief survey of the status of
prisoners' rights during the pre-World War II era. It then focuses on the
evolution of these rights after World War II, the pivotal European era. This
section also introduces and discusses several important regional public
international law instruments that have a significant impact on the rights of
14 Comparative studies are extremely useful in the legal field as the international legal
community expands, intensifies its level of interaction, and continues to encounter and
experience similar legal problems. E.g. Association is Conducting a Self-Study, American
Association of Law Schools Newsletter, (Association of American Law Schools, Washington
D.C.), Aug. 1995, at 1-3; The Association of American Law School's Role as an International
Learning Society, American Association of Law Schools Newsletter, (Association of American
Law Schools, Washington D.C.) Aug. 1995, at 1-3; GEORGE F. COLE ET AL., MAJOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 7-8 (George F. Cole et al., eds. 1981) (discussing the important
value of comparative study).
" See John Muncie & Richard Sparks, Introduction to IMPRISONMENT: EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVES vii (John Muncie & Richard Sparks eds., 1991) (comparative study is important
at a time when problems of imprisonment "are at the forefront of public consciousness and
debate") [hereinafter Muncie & Sparks]; Faugeron, Prisons in France, supra note 7, at vi; see
also JEROME L. NEAPOLTAN, CROSS-NATIONAL CRIME, xi-xiii (touting the benefits accruing
from cross-national or comparative crime analysis). The comparative study of prisoners'
rights and conditions of confinement is not a novel endeavor. In the late 1700's John
Howard, the Sheriff of Bedford in England, toured Britain and Europe to survey and compare
prison systems. JOHN HOWARD, THE STATE OF THE PRISONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, WITH
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, AND AN ACCOUNT OF SOME FOREIGN PRISONS AND HOSPITALS
(Professional Books Ltd. 1977) (1777).
26 Muncie & Sparks, supra note 15, at vii.
17 The emphasis is on developments that have occurred during the 20th century. The few
references to the pre-20th century status of prisoners are provided to illuminate specific
aspects of the progress made in this area.
[Vol. 27:1
PRISONERS' RIGHTS
imprisoned persons. The final section compares the progress taken by the
United States and Europe and also examines the current differences and
similarities in the status of the prisoners' rights in both jurisdictions.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRISONERS' RIGHTS
Incarceration as the primary means of punishment is a relatively recent
phenomenon." Prior to the adoption of this mode of punishment other
punitive sanctions, such as capital punishment, corporal punishment, and
banishment, were commonly used.' 9
A. The United States' Experience
Prisoners' rights in the United States have undergone a monumental
transformation.2" Their evolution runs the gamut from the "slave of the
state" doctrine to the "rights enforcement" era to the current modified
"hands-off' approach.
Initially, the rights of individuals confined in penal institutions were
governed by the "slave of the state" doctrine.2' As its name strongly
suggests, this approach did not afford any rights to incarcerated individuals.
This passage aptly describes the doctrine's attributes:
18 See generally, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT
IN WESTERN SOCIETY (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995), 3-77; MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan, trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995)
(1978); BLAKE MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A HISTORY OF GOOD INTENTIONS 1-33
(1977) (describing the evolution of early American prisons).
'9 See Morris & Rothman, supra note 18, at 3-24, 27-30, 35-45, 49-68; FOUCAULT, supra
note 18, at 32-35; MCKELVEY, supra note 18, at 1-10.
20 For an excellent history of the American prisons see generally MCKELVEY, supra note
18; see also Morris & Rothman, supra note 18, at 227-59.
21 See John J. DiIulio, Jr., Introduction: Enhancing Judicial Capacity, in COURTS,
CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 3, 3 (John J. Dilulio, Jr. ed., 1990); see also RONALD
BERKMAN, OPENING THE GATES: THE RISE OF THE PRISONERS' MOVEMENT 40-41 (1979).
The "slave of the state" doctrine dominated the correctional landscape from the 1800's until
the mid-1900's. However, in some jurisdictions it retained its vitality until the early 1970's.
See generally DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN SLAVERY:" PARCHMAN FARM AND THE
ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1996). Oshinsky's book provides a detailed, and at times
disturbing, description of the "slave of the state" era in Mississippi.
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For the time being, during his [the convicted felon's] term of service
in the penitentiary, he is in a state of penal servitude to the State. He
has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but
all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity
accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State. He is
civiliter mortuus; and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that
of a dead man.22
This absence of rights made prisoners equivalent to being state property.
This in turn detrimentally impacted their conditions of confinement. The
conditions were uniformly abysmal, dependent upon the whim and fancy of
the governing correctional authority, and frequently bordered on the horrific.
For example, Mississippi and other Southern states did not even have formal
penal institutions; instead, a system was devised that leased inmates to
private employers.23 By adopting this scheme, the state could transfer the
care of and responsibility for the prisoners to the contracting employers.
Unsurprisingly, inmates were severely abused under this "correctional
system."'24 The employers' refusal to provide the contractually mandated
22 LYNN S. BRANHAM & SHELDON KRANTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 279-80 (5th ed. 1997) (citing Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790 (Court of Appeals of Virginia 1871) (emphasis added)); see also
OSHINSKY, supra note 21, at 11-53 (discussing Mississippi's implementation of the slave of
the state doctrine through its convict "leasing" program).
23 See OSHINSKY, supra note 21, at 31-100. Oshinsky notes that
[t]he South's economic development can be traced by the blood of its prisoners. In
Texas, convicts worked in coal mines, lumber mills, and railroad camps across the
state. The great bulk of them were shipped to the developing sugarcane plantations,
where field work was exhausting and free labor scarce. Without convict leasing, the
Texas sugar industry would have been hard pressed to survive. By the early 1900s
more than half of the state's four thousand prisoners were on lease to outside farms
at a monthly rate of $21 for a "first class hand." [footnotes omitted]
Id. at 60; see also MCKELVEY, supra note 18, at 197-216. Convict leasing schemes also
existed in Northern States. LEWIS LAWES, 20,000 YEARS IN SING SING 89 (1942).
24 See OSHINSKY, supra note 21, at 55-62. For example, convicts leased to railroads were
exposed to an extremely precarious "correctional" environment. These individuals were
subjected to the following conditions:
On many railroads, convicts were moved from job to job in a rolling iron cage, which
also provided their lodging at the site. The cage-eight feet wide, fifteen feet long, and
eight feet high-housed upwards of twenty men .... The prisoners slept side by side,
shackled together, on narrow wooden slabs. They relieved themselves in a single bucket
and bathed in the same filthy tub of water. . . . It was like a small piece of hell, an
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adequate care ultimately led to the system's failure.
Although the penal contract labor system was almost universally abolished
by the late 1920s, 5 the inmates' situation did not significantly improve.
If anything their situation remained static because the states maintained their
status as "slaves of the state" vis-a-vis the adoption and implementation of
penal farms, the heir to the convict leasing program.26 In Mississippi this
meant working many grueling hours in the penal farms' fields, being guarded
by gun-toting prison trustees, who would be pardoned if they shot and killed
an escapee, and being severely beaten with "Black Annie. ' 27  These
conditions, and the corresponding lack of rights, remained virtually
unchanged for at least the next two decades.
From the late 1940s through the early 1950s signs appeared that indicated
the beginning of an advancement in prisoners' rights.28  The stage was
being set for the establishment of the "hands-off' era.29 While this phase
did not produce monumental steps towards recognizing and/or enforcing the
rights of prisoners, it is nonetheless a critical phase because it marked the
judiciary's increased willingness to acknowledge the plight of incarcerated
individuals. Although, ultimately, few, if any, substantive changes were
realized because, despite its increased awareness of the deplorable situations,
the judiciary rarely intervened to correct the injustices.30
The key rationales offered to support the "hands-off' approach were: the
perceived propriety of deferring to the prison officials' expertise and
federalism issues that could arise if federal courts intervened in controversies
that existed between state penal facilities and state prisoners." These
observer noted-the stench, the chains, the sickness, and the heat.
Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
2 See id. at 56.
26 See id. at 109-55.
27 "Black Annie" was the name given to the strap used to administer corporal punishment
to the inmates. Id. at 135-50. See also Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 895 (N.D. Miss.
1972), aft'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
28 See Morris & Rothman, supra note 18, at 188-192; PRISON CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES: A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT (Human Rights Watch 1991), at 101-02; see
generally MCKELVEY, supra note 18, at ch. 12.
29 See BRANHAM & KRANTZ, supra note 22, at 280-82.
3 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974) ("[tiraditionally, federal courts have
adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration"); see, e.g.,
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1968) ("[tlhe federal courts, including this
one, entertain a natural reluctance to interfere with a prison's internal discipline").
31 See Dilulio, supra note 21, at 12-42.
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proferred justifications appear in the following description of the "hands-off'
perspective:
Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude
toward problems of prison administration. In part this policy is the
product of various limitations on the scope of federal review of
conditions in state penal institutions. More fundamentally, this attitude
springs from complementary perceptions about the nature of the
problems and the efficacy of judicial intervention. Prison administra-
tors are responsible for maintaining internal order and discipline, for
securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and
for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate
resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The Herculean
obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too apparent to
warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in
America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are
not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require
expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources,
all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and
executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts
are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of
prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact
reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where
state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further
reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.32
Deferring to prison officials' "expertise" under the guise of adopting a
formal position with respect to the rights of incarcerated persons set the tone
of the prisoners' rights landscape for many years. It also effectively under-
mined the potential for substantive advances in this area. In fact, it was not
until 1962 that the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment was deemed applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.33
32 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).
3 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
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It was not until the mid to late 1960s that federal courts finally began to
exhibit a willingness to deviate from the "hands-off' course of (in)action.34
Several factors were instrumental in providing the impetus for this change.
Perhaps most important was that the magnitude of the horrors in the nation's
prisons was such that judges could no longer justify their refusal to
intervene.35 The Supreme Court's ruling that the Eighth Amendment
applied to the states 36 also led to these changes because it provided inmates
with a strong foundation upon which to base suits challenging the conditions
34 See BERKMAN, supra note 21, at 41 (noting that during the 1960's "[clourts became
more willing to intervene and rule on issues dealing specifically with the conditions of
confinement."); Human Rights Watch, supra note 28, at 102; MCKELVEY, supra note 18, at
360-61 (discussing the relaxation of the "hands-off' policy); see, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 268
F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969); see
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that any use of a leather strap
violates the 8th Amendment); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), afftd,
remanded, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (affirming the district court's holding that Arkansas'
penitentiary system violated both the 8th and 14th Amendments because of an inmate guard
system, extensive isolation, and the absence of meaningful rehabilitation); Pugh v. Locke, 406
F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (holding that Alabama's penal institutions violated the 8th
Amendment by creating a climate of violence in which inmates feared for their personal
safety); Estelle v. Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Texas 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 679
F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's holding
that the Texas penal system violated the 8th Amendment by prisoner overcrowding and lack
of space).
" See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1302 (5th Cir. 1974) (commenting on how for
years courts "close[d] their judicial eyes to prison conditions which present[ed] a grave and
immediate threat to [the prisoners'] health or physical well being") (citations omitted)).
The following passage for example, describes the horrendous living conditions that men
imprisoned at the Cummins Farm penal facility in Arkansas endured for years and the
judiciary resolutely refused to remedy for years:
1,000 inmates [at one prison] ... work[ed] in the fields 10 hours a day, six days a week,
using mule-drawn tools and tending crops by hand. The inmates were sometimes required
to run to and from the fields, with a guard in an automobile or on horseback driving them
on. They worked in all sorts of weather, so long as the temperature was above freezing,
sometimes in unsuitably light clothing or without shoes. The inmates slept together in
large, 100-man barracks, and some convicts, known as 'creepers,' would slip from their
beds to crawl along the floor, stalking their sleeping enemies. In one 18-month period,
there were 17 stabbings, all but 1 occurring in the barracks. Homosexual rape was so
common and uncontrolled that some potential victims dared not sleep; instead they would
leave their beds and spend the night clinging to the bars nearest the guards' stations.
Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678, 681 n.3 (1978) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
36 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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of confinement in state penal facilities.37 Similarly, the Court's decision
that, under certain circumstances, actions for the violation of constitutional
rights could be commenced against state officials reinforced the substantiality
of these suits. 3 Consequently, the "hands-off' method gradually eroded as
the removal of systemic obstacles enabled courts to become increasingly
rights oriented.39
Despite this favorable genesis, the movement away from the "hands-off'
stage towards the "rights enforcement" stage was gradual. For example, in
earlier cases, some judges, while finding problems with the disputed practice
or practices, would continue to avoid granting relief by emphasizing the
limited role the judiciary played when prisoners' rights were the basis for the
controversy. 4° Ultimately, the "rights enforcement" stage emerged schizo-
phrenically as the courts oscillated between applying the "hands-off' doctrine
and chiseling exceptions and applying them to this traditional standard. This
developmental track is best described as a "rule/exception" model, where
"hands-off' was the rule and "rights enforcement" the exception.
41
Increasingly this "rule/exception methodology" was used to justify the
increase of judicial activity in this historically sacrosanct area.42 Eventually
31 See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
38 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1983 permits
individuals to seek a remedy in federal court for violations of federally guaranteed rights if
the offender is acting under "color of law").
39 See BERKMAN, supra note 21, at 41 (discussing other factors that influenced the federal
judiciary's entrance into the prisoners' rights arena).
4o The course of action taken by the court in Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D.
Ark. 1967) (holding that use of the strap to discipline inmates must be accompanied by
appropriate safeguards), demonstrates the use of this tactic.
41 This modus operandi is illustrated by what transpired in one case. There, before even
discussing the case's substantive issues, the judges emphasized that:
[T]he court is especially conscious of the limitations of its function in cases of this
kind .... It is well settled that the administration of state prison discipline is the
primary responsibility of state officials, and federal courts have an extremely limited
area in which they may act pertaining to the treatment of prisoners confined in state
penal institutions.... However, it is equally well settled that there are exceptions to
these rules when special circumstances exist and constitutional rights are involved.
Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804, 807 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (emphasis added), vacated and
remanded, 404 F. 2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (finding that any use of the strap was unconstitution-
al).
42 See Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 893 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (stating that the court
is "reluctant to interfere" but is obligated to because the prison is "maintained and operated
in a manner violative of rights secured to inmates by the United States Constitution"), ajfd,
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it reached the point where the "exceptions" engulfed the "rule." This state
of affairs resulted in the demise of the "hands-off' era and culminated in the
judiciary's decision to install a "rights" oriented approach to the resolution
of prisoners' rights issues.43 The acceptance of this methodology can be
traced to the early 1970s 4 and is reflected in the Supreme Court's 1974
statement that:
[A] policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take
cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal
or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a
fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge
their duty to protect constitutional rights.45
This same year also produced the Court's oft-quoted pronouncement that "[a]
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is
imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the
Constitution and the prisons of this country. ,46
The phase's zenith occurred between the late-1970s and the early to mid-
1980s.47 During that time, extensive judicial activity was directed at
501 F.2d 1291, 1321 (5th Cir. 1974) (observing that "[t]he past notoriety of the protracted
inhumane conditions and practices at Parchman reveals the necessity for the continuance of
the injunctive order of the district court"); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970),
affd and remanded, 442 F.2d 304, 307 (8th Cir. 1971) (stating that federal courts should
refrain from interfering with state prison operations unless "intervention is warranted ... upon
a clear showing of a violation of a federally guaranteed constitutional right"); Jackson v.
Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967), vacated and remanded, 404 F.2d 571, 577 (8th
Cir. 1968) (recognizing that the courts traditional hesitation to become involved in cases
pertaining to prison operations ceases when there are "petitions asserting violations of
fundamental rights").
43 The transformation of the Arkansas prison system provides an excellent illustration of
how the "rights enforcement" era came to fruition. See Appendix A.
4See BERKMAN, supra note 21, at 41-43; Human Rights Watch, supra note 28, at 102;
MCKELVEY, supra note 21, at 360-63.
4' 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974) (emphasis added). The Court's statement confirmed the
validity of the "rights enforcement" through the use of the phrase "will discharge their duty."
This affirmative mandate is contrary to the situation that existed in the preceding era when
courts were charged to act passively vis-a-vis the deference they were required to give to state
prison officials.
46 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (emphasis added).
47 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 28, at 102.
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ensuring that the rights of prisoners were not trampled.48 A prime exemplar
of the federal judiciary's commitment to following the principles of the
"rights enforcement" method is found in Judge Frank Johnson's decision to
declare Alabama's prison system unconstitutional due to Eighth Amendment
violations. Judge Johnson opined that:
While this Court continues to recognize the broad discretion required
for prison officials to maintain orderly and secure institutions,
constitutional deprivations of the magnitude presented here simply
cannot be countenanced, and this Court is under a duty to, and will,
intervene to protect incarcerated citizens from such wholesale
infringements of their constitutional rights.49
As rioted by Judge Johnson, this era functioned from the perspective of
making the confined's rights, as opposed to the state institution's interests,
the focal point of the courts' concern. As a result of the vigorous judicial
scrutiny that occurred during this time, many jurisdictions' penal facilities
were, and remain, subject to an injunction or a consent decree. 0
Eventually, however, this progressive environment, from the incarcerated
individual's perspective, moved into the present stage, which is a modified
48 See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 328 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (providing an extensive,
but non-exhaustive list, of prisoners' rights cases); see also Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d
1080 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987) (addressing the constitutionality of
prison conditions for inmates confined to administrative segregation housing units at specific
California prisons); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affid and rev'd, 679
F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (litigation on conditions of confinement in Texas state prisons);
Status Report: State Prisons and the Courts, 10 THE NAT'L PRISON PROJECr J., (Am. Civil
Liberties Union Found.) Winter 1994/95 at 5 (summarizing the status of cases in jurisdictions
that have prison conditions litigation); see also Alvin J. Bronstein & Jenni Gainsborough,
Prison Litigation: Past, Present, and Future, 7 OVERCROWDED TIMES, June 1996, at 1, 15.
The Supreme Court's willingness to allow the prisoners' attorneys to recover their fees also
contributed to the creation of this favorable environment by making it less burdensome for
counsel to pursue these cases. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689-700 (1978).
49 Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. at 328 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also
Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
50 See Status Report: State Prisons and the Courts, supra note 48 (listing the states
subject to consent decrees or injunctions in conditions of confinement cases). However, a
substantial decrease in the number of states under judicial orders in prisoners' rights litigation
is anticipated because of the Prison Legal Reform Act of 1996. See infra p. 19.
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version of the traditional "hands-off' policy.5 The shift towards this phase
could begin to be detected during the early to mid-1980s.52 For example,
what occurred in Rhodes v. Chapman53 is indicative of the ensuing demise
of the "rights enforcement" age. In Rhodes, inmates filed a class action
against the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.54 The plaintiffs alleged
that the prison's double-ceiling policy violated their Eighth Amendment
rights.55 Agreeing with the plaintiffs, the District Court held that the
conditions of confinement combined with the defendant's practice of double-
celling violated the Eighth Amendment.56 The court's determination was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.57 In reversing the
Court of Appeals decision,58 the Supreme Court reasoned that, "[t]o the
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses. 59 This statement,
specifically the use of the word "harsh," conveys the Court's directive that
the federal judiciary retreat from the prevailing rights enforcement posture
that had found conditions characterized as "harsh" to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. Accordingly, the Court's message to the federal
51 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 28, at 102-03.
52 The following are among the cases that marked the change from the "rights
enforcement" phase to the present "modified hands-off" era: O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342, 349-53 (1987) (holding that a specific prison regulation did not impair the free
exercise of religion unless a rational basis furthering a legitimate penological goal did not
exist); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,89 (1987) (declaring that the constitutionality of prison
regulations that impair or infringe an incarcerated person's constitutional rights are judged by
the "rational basis" test); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (holding that various prison
practices did not violate the Constitution); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976)
(holding that in cases involving Eighth Amendment challenges to medical care an inmate
must establish that the prison showed "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs").
This trend was firmly established by the more recent holdings in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 302-04 (1991) (holding that an incarcerated individual needs to prove that prison officials
were deliberately indifferent to rights), and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-47 (1994)
(adopting a stringent definition of deliberate indifference). See also Cheryl Dunn Giles, Note,
Turner v. Safley and It's Progeny: A Gradual Retreat to the "Hands-Off" Doctrine?, 35
ARIz. L. REv. 219 (1993).
53 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
See id.
5 See id. at 339-40.
5 See id. at 343.
7 Chapman v. Rhodes, 624 F. 2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980).
s Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352.
'9 Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
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judiciary is that harsh conditions, like confinement itself, are simply part of
the punishment.
Further evidence of this shift is found in Ruiz v. Estelle.6° In 1972 David
Ruiz, an inmate confined at a Texas correctional facility, commenced an
action challenging the constitutionality of the conditions of confinement at
a Texas prison.6' Ultimately, the complaint became a systemic attack on
the constitutionality of various conditions of confinement at the Texas
62 th6as3prisons. When the trial was held six years later,6 it was conducted
during the "rights enforcement" stage. Agreeing with the plaintiffs'
allegations, Judge Justice held that the conditions at the Texas prisons
violated the Eighth Amendment.' This decision was consistent with the
principles governing prisoners' rights that prevailed in 1978,65 the year the
trial was held; namely, to ensure that prisoners' rights were not violated and,
if they were, to remedy such violations.66 In 1980 Judge Justice entered a
remedial order mandating that the existing prison system undergo extensive
changes because "[tihe record clearly manifests that the necessary changes
cannot be effected under TDC's [the Texas Department of Corrections]
existing organizational structure."'67
60 Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Texas 1980), affid in part, rev'd in part and
remanded, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982).
61 See Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1275. Later Mr. Ruiz's case was consolidated with several
others and eventually the individual actions were certified as a class action. Id. at 1275-76.
62 Id. at 1277. The contested conditions included: health care, fire and safety, physical
safety, sanitation, access to courts, overcrowding, and disciplinary hearing procedures. Id. at
1276-77.
63 Id. at 1275-76.
6Id. at 1383-84, 1391.
0 Judge Justice states that "in the past, courts have been particularly cautious about
immersing themselves into the day-to-day management of prison systems." 503 F. Supp. at
1386-87 (emphasis added). The court's use of the past tense when referring to the traditional
"hands-off' approach confirms that the issues presented in Ruiz were considered from the
"rights enforcement" perspective. In addition, only a few years had passed since the Supreme
Court declared that "federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights [of
prisoners]." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974) (emphasis added).
"Judge Justice noted that he was compelled to take such action because "these iniquitous
and distressing circumstances are prohibited by the great constitutional principles that no
human being, regardless of how disfavored by society, shall be subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment or be deprived of the due process of the law within the United States of
America." Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1391.
67 Id. at 1387.
[Vol. 27:1
PRISONERS' RIGHTS
However, after this opinion was issued, but before the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Rhodes v. Chapman.6" Relying upon this intervening Supreme
Court decision, the Court of Appeals eviscerated the District Court's order
by declaring that Rhodes provided new guidelines pertaining to the
evaluation of Eighth Amendment challenges to conditions of confinement. 69
The discovery of these new guidelines corresponded with the court's
observation that "[a]s a matter of respect for the state's role and for the
allocation of functions in our federal system, as well as comity towards the
state, the relief ordered by federal courts must be 'consistent with the policy
of minimum intrusion into the affairs of state prison administration that the
Supreme Court has articulated for the federal courts.' ,,70 Thus, Ruiz v.
Estelle ran the modem evolutionary gamut from the "rights enforcement"
stage to the adoption of the present "modified hands-off' doctrine.
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s an increasing number of cases
suffered the same fate as Ruiz as more courts followed the new path paved
by the Supreme Court.7  A few jurisdictions, however, were hold outs and
" Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
69 See Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1137-40.70 Id. at 1145 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). This statement reveals how the central
concern in prison conditions cases retreated from enforcing the inmates' constitutional rights.
A posture contrary to the one propounded during the "rights enforcement" era, but consistent
with that which existed during the "hands-off' phase. See supra at 9-10 (discussing the
"hands-off' era).
7' See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-53 (1987) (holding that inmates'
rights of free exercise of religion is impaired only if the regulation is not reasonably related
to furthering a legitimate penological goal); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 86-91 (1987)
(stating that the "reasonable relationship test" should be applied to determine the constitution-
ality of prison regulations); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that an
inmate must establish that prison officials exhibited "deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs"); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (reaffirming that inmates must prove that
prison officials acted "deliberately indifferent"); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)
(stating that "deliberate indifference" requires proving that the prison official had knowledge
of a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate and failed to take reasonable measures to
abate the risk); cf The Religious Freedom Reformation Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 200066-
200066-4 (Supp. 1998) (reversing the O'Lone standard and reinstating the application of the
"compelling state interest" test to inmate cases challenging the constitutionality of prison rules
regulating prisoners' religious practices). The Act was declared unconstitutional in Boerne
v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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adhered to the "rights enforcement" position.72 However, as a general
proposition the "rights enforcement" scheme lost its dominance.
The bomb that destroyed the remnants of the "rights enforcement" doctrine
was dropped by the Supreme Court during its 1996 term. 3 In deciding the
right of access to the courts issue presented by the prisoner plaintiffs in
Casey v. Lewis,74 the District Court was guided by the principles of the
"rights enforcement doctrine." 75 After ruling favorably for the plaintiffs,
an extensive remedial order was developed.76 In reviewing the case, most
of the Supreme Court Justices forcefully and unequivocally announced the
cessation of the "rights enforcement" era.77 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, illustrates this turn of events through his pronouncement that prison
litigation necessitates the application of "a deferential standard" 78 because:
it is for the political branches of the State and Federal Governments
to manage prisons in such fashion that official interference with the
presentation of claims will not occur. Of course the two roles briefly
and partially coincide when a court ... orders the alteration of an
institutional organization or procedure that causes the harm.79
This argument, based on a preference for a substantially unfettered prison
administration, is reminiscent of the rationales posited during the earlier
"hands-off' phase.'0 In fact, Justice Scalia's view that Casey was "the one
plus ultra of what our opinions have lamented as a court's 'in the name of
the Constitution, becom[ing] ... enmeshed in the minutiae of prison
operations,' ,,.. parrots this earlier doctrine. In an effort to urge the
adoption of a minimally revised "hands-off' approach, Justice Scalia
scathingly admonished the trial judge in Casey by noting that "this case is
72 See, e.g., Coleman v. Wilson, 933 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Cal. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1823 (1997); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1823 (1997); Gates v. Deukmejian, 1988 WL 92568 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 27, 1988), 977 F.2d
1300, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1992).
73 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
74 Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1533 (D. Ariz. 1992), affid, 43 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1994),
rev'd, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
7' Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. at 1566.
76 See Casey v. Lewis, 43 F.3d at 1261, 1272-1283.
77 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 361-62.
78 See id. at 361.
79 Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
80 See supra at pp. 9-10 (discussing the "hands-off' era).
8' Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 362 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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a model of what should not [be done]."82 Echoing the traditional position,
the primary reasons proffered by the Court for adopting this modified
"hands-off' approach to resolve prisoners' rights controversies are the
concerns that judicial activity in this area could offend the principles of
separation of powers and federalism. 3 Consequently, contemporary efforts
to enforce prisoners' rights will be constrained by the prevailing "modified
hands-off' doctrine. Like its parent, the traditional "hands-off' standard, this
position requires substantial deference to the states power to inflict punitive
sanctions. Apparently, the only conceived exception is if a situation presents
monstrously cruel conditions or violations.
The entrenchment of the modified "hands-off' approach was secured when
Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996,84 comprehen-
sive legislation that adversely affects prisoners' rights. Section 3626 focuses
on the remedial facet of prison conditions cases.8 5 Several provisions
severely hamper prisoners' ability to access to the courts. For example,
consent decrees and injunctions that provide prospective relief can expire two
years after they are granted.8 6  This measure undermines the guarantees
provided by the previous scheme because prior to the institution of this short
remedial time frame prisoner plaintiffs were more likely to obtain full relief.
Now, the PLRA confers upon the prisoner plaintiff the burden of proving
why the injunction should not essentially be automatically dissolved.8 7
82 Id. at 363.
83 Justice Scalia states that the trial court violated the separation of powers precept by not
"preventing courts from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches." See id. at 357.
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion contains an extensive discussion of how the principles
of federalism and separation of powers warrant using the modified "hands-off' approach. Id.
at 364, 385-88. He advises that the "[plrinciples-of federalism and separation of powers
dictate that exclusive responsibility for administering state prisons resides with the State and
its officials." Id. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). He argues that, "State
prisons should be run by the state officials with the expertise and the primary authority for
running such institutions. Absent the most 'extraordinary circumstances,' federal courts
should refrain from meddling in such affairs. Prison administrators have a difficult enough
job without federal court intervention." Id. at 387 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
8 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (Supp. 1996). President Clinton signed the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) on April 26, 1996.
85 P.L.R.A. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1996).
6 See id. at (b)(1)(i).
8 See id. at (b)(4). The PLRA also amends the sections of the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act that apply to suits initiated by prisoners. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a, §
1997e(c) (West Supp. 1998). For example, prisoners are prohibited from initiating prison
conditions litigation until all administrative remedies are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
(West Supp. 1998). Other provisions that benefit the defendants in prison cases include
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The PLRA was largely developed and enacted in response to the public's
perception that prisoners are overly litigious.88 However, it is foolhardy to
rely on this justification for the PLRA's existence. As previously noted, the
public has been misled as to the gravity of most prisoner suits. The public
also has been led to believe that the number of complaints filed by prisoners
has recently increased astronomically. While the growth in prisoner
complaints has not been "astronomical," it has been significant. Therefore,
the public is not entirely incorrect. The information used to shape the
public's impression, however, failed to include the impact another critical
factor has had on the growth in the number of court petitions filed by
prisoners. This omitted factor is the increase in the nation's prison
population. 9 It is not surprising that the number of complaints received by
the courts reflects this explosion in the national prison population.' In
sum, the present non-receptive modified hands-off phase is reinforced by the
waiving the requirement that the defendant file a responsive pleading to an inmate complaint.
42 U.S.C § 1997e(g)(1). In addition, this "waiver" does not constitute an admission of the
allegations contained in the complaint. Id. Lastly, requirements for pro se inmates who
request to proceed in forma pauperis were also significantly altered in a manner detrimental
to the right of access to the courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), (b)(1) (West Supp. 1998). See
also Simone Schoenberger, Note, Access Denied: The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 86 KY.
L.J. 257, 457 (1997-98) (discussing the PLRA's effects on prisoners' rights of access to the
courts).
8 The chunky versus smooth peanut butter case is a well-known example of a prison suit
that fueled the public's perception of frivolously litigious prisoners. In that case, the media
portrayed the prisoner's suit as one challenging the constitutionality of the prison's decision
not to stock smooth peanut butter. Prisoner Lawsuits, 11 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J., Winter
1996, at 1. The ensuing media attention the public believing that a great number of prisoner
claims fit this category-untenable and inane. Regrettably, the media's irresponsibility
enabled state Attorney Generals to capitalize on the situation by using the media's promotion
of the event to advance their anti-prison litigation agenda. The losers are those with tenable
grievances who are haunted by one person's foibles. More important is that the incident was
incredibly and irresponsibly distorted. It is now known, although not widely because the
media chose not to "report" it, that the issue in the case was about the "prison's failure to
refund the prisoner money he was due," and not about the availability of chunky or smooth
peanut butter. Id. Consequently, public opinion, which played a pivotal role in justifying the
adoption of the bill, was based on "a great deal of disinformation." Id.
89 See supra p. 3 (providing statistics on the U.S. incarceration population).
90 See, e.g., Philip Hager, Should Inmates Suit Themselves? CAL. LAW., May 1995, at 33
(discussing how California's 'Three Strikes and You're Out" legislation will increase an
already burgeoning prison population and result in an increase in the number of grievances
lodged with the courts).
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burgeoning prison population and the contemporary mythology associated
with prisoners efforts to gain access to the judiciary.
B. Europe's Experience
In general, the early stages in the development of prisoners' rights in
Europe paralleled those in the United States.9' However, the devastating
aftermath of the Second World War profoundly shaped the course of events
in the evolution of the rights of those imprisoned in European countries. 92
The birth of the Council of Europe in 1949 was a crucial milestone with
respect to producing a general commitment to the status and treatment of
detainees. The havoc wreaked upon Europe during the Second World War
was the impetus for the creation of the Council. The organization's central
tenets, to "achieve ... greater unity between its members, 93 and "to
protect human rights," 94 reflect the circumstances of its genesis.
To achieve these goals the Council promulgated a variety of legislative
initiatives. Three are notable for their recognition and advancement of the
rights of the imprisoned. 95 Two are regional public international law
treaties, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms96 and the European Convention for the Prevention
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 97 and the
9' See generally HOWARD, supra note 15 (describing the rights of the incarcerated and the
conditions of confinement in 18th century England and European countries); FOUCAULT,
supra note 18 (describing the conditions of confinement at French prisons during the pre-
Enlightenment era); Morris & Rothman, supra note 18; JANET SEMPLE, BENTHAM'S PRISON
(1993); FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD (David McDuff trans., Penguin
Books 1985) (1860) (describing the status of the incarcerated and their rights during 19th
century Russia); GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIA-
RY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE (Southern Illinois
University Press 1979) (1833).
9 See JANIS, supra note 3, at 18-20, 122.
93 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 at pmbl. [hereinafter ECHR]. See generally REYNAUD, supra
note 3, at 15 (describing the Council's two statutory objectives).
94 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: ACHIEVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES 3
(1995).
95 See Appendix B.
96 See ECHR, supra note 93.
' European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. No. 126 [hereinafter ECPT].
1998]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
third, a set of advisory prison regulations, is the European Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.98 These instruments
directly impact the rights of prisoners, their conditions of confinement, and
their status in the European Community.
1. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is a legally enforceable and binding regional
international treaty. It was signed in Rome, Italy on November 4, 1950 and
came into force on September 3, 1953.99 Although the ECHR's substantive
provisions are modeled after the United Nation's Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,'0° the Council ultimately drafted and approved a personal-
ized version of the Universal Declaration.'O° The Council's decision to
select a European version of the Universal Declaration originated in its
concern that the non-binding character of the Universal Declaration was
insufficient to ensure "a collective guarantee of human rights."' 2 Despite
this critical enforcement difference, many of the ECHR's provisos are
' Council of Europe, European Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
Recommendation No. R(87)3 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States (Strasbourg,
Feb. 12, 1987) [hereinafter European Prison Rules]. This body of rules is commonly referred
to as the "European Prison Rules."
9 ECHR, supra note 93.
100 The United Nation's General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, a ion-binding instrument, on December 10, 1948. Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. The
formulation and adoption of the Universal Declaration was also prompted by the human rights
abuses that occurred during the Second World War. The Declaration itself is modeled after
France's 1789 Declaration of Rights. See Johannes Morsink, World War Two and the
Universal Declaration, 15 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 357, 357-58 (1993). The document's
status as a non-binding declaration, however, means that it is unenforceable. Nonetheless, it
does exercise significant power as a "moral authority." See REYNAUD, supra note 3, at 12.
'0 See ECHR, supra note 93, at pmbl.
0 STEPHEN LIVINGSTONE & TIM OWEN, PRISON LAW 78 (1993); see, e.g., ECHR, supra
note 93, at pmbl. (noting that the critical objective of the Council is to achieve "greater unity
between [the] members" and that this requires the "further realization of human rights and




patterned after those in the Universal Declaration's. °3
In addition to granting specific rights, the ECHR has a broad scope. In
1962 the European Court of Human Rights °'4 decided that the ECHR
encompassed individuals confined in penal facilities.'0 5 The justification
for this decision was based on the ECHR's governing principle of universali-
ty."° This ruling was critical because Article 3 of the ECHR focuses on
matters that are of great concern to prisoners. The most important one is
Article 3's mandate that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."' 0 7
A significant addition to the ECHR's enumeration of human rights is the
existence of a control mechanism to enforce these rights. Presently this
enforcement arm is bicameral. It is composed of the European Commission
of Human Rights ("the Commission") and the European Court of Human
Rights ("the Court").0" The enforcement scheme allows a High Contract-
ing Party (a signatory State), an individual, a group of individuals, and non-
103 For example, both instruments guarantee the individual the right to freely practice
religion. See ECHR, supra note 93, at § 1, art. 9; Universal Declaration, supra note 100, at
art. 18.
However, some of the rights conferred by the Universal Declaration are excluded from the
ECHR. The omitted guarantees include the "right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself . . , including . . . medical care." Universal Declaration,
supra note 100, at art. 25; ECHR, supra note 93.
104 This is the highest reviewing authority in the ECHR's adjudicatory scheme. See
ECHR, supra note 93, at § N, art. 47.
" See Koch v. Fed, Republic of Germany, 1962 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. (Eur. Ct.
H.R.) 126.
" This provision states that: "The rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground." ECHR, supra note 93, at § 1, art. 14
(emphasis added); see also Giuseppe Guarnieri, Address in Marly-le-Roi, France (Oct. 25-27,
1996), in MONITORING PRISON CONDITIONS, supra note 12, at 15 (noting that the principles
of universality and non-discrimination prohibit exclusion of detainees from the ECHR's
protections). The appropriateness of this ruling is confirmed by the number of penal detainees
in penal facilities who seek assistance under the ECHR. "Each year, about 30% of the
complaints submitted to the [ECHR] emanate from people who are deprived of their freedom
and most of these complaints concern their conditions of detention." Id. at 13-14.
" ECHR, supra note 93, at § I, art. 3. This prohibition is another feature shared by the
ECHR and the Universal Declaration. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration states: "No one
shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
Universal Declaration, supra note 100, at art. 5.
"0 ECHR, supra note 93, at § II, art. 19. Detailed descriptions of how these bodies
operate are contained in LIVINGSTONE & OWEN, supra note 102, at 78-92.
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governmental organizations to file petitions alleging a breach of a right or
rights contained in the ECHR with the Commission.' °9 Filing the petition
activates the Commission's dual functions: acting as the gatekeeper and as
the court of first impression." ° Subsequently, the Commission performs
what is tantamount to a jurisdictional inquiry. This requires ascertaining
whether the petitioner exhausted all domestic remedies and whether the
grievance was filed within six months after a final judgment was rendered
by the relevant domestic tribunal."' The latter inquiry also functions as
a statute of limitations, which could ultimately prohibit an imprisoned person
from being heard.
If the jurisdictional prerequisites are satisfied" 2 and no other reason
exists to dismiss the petition," 3 then an investigation of the situation
prompting the allegations is commenced." 4  At this point, a critical
function of the Commission occurs: the facilitation of a "friendly settle-
ment" of the parties' controversy. 5 If this objective is unattainable, then
the Court becomes accessible." 6 Since the Court's principal function is to
review the Commission's decisions, it primarily acts as an appellate tribunal.
Originally, only the High Contracting Parties, member states of the Council,
'o9 See ECHR, supra note 93, at § III, art. 25(1).
"o See id. at § III, arts. 24-37.
. See id. at § III, art. 26. With respect to the local exhaustion requirement, the Court
of Human Rights has expressed a preference for the member States to incorporate the ECHR
into domestic law. Jorg Polakiewicz, The Application of the European Convention on Human
Rights in Domestic Law, 17 HUM. RTs. L.J. 405 (1996). This "suggestion" has prompted
action by the member States as the current trend is for member States to incorporate the
ECHR's substantive norms into domestic legislation. Id. at 406. "The benefits of
incorporation are obvious. Incorporation gives national authorities the opportunity to afford
redress in cases of human rights violations before the case is taken to Strasbourg. Protracted
proceedings in a forum that is both remote from and unfamiliar to the claimant can be spared.
The settlement of litigation on the national level, saving both time and money, always remains
the preferable solution." Id. Thus, prisoners could benefit from this policy as it could
facilitate reducing what is presently a lengthy adjudicatory process, which would aid in
providing timely remedies; hence, in some cases, more meaningful and effective relief.
12 See ECHR, supra note 93, at § 11, art, 26.
..3 For example, the Commission has the power to dismiss the petition for "an abuse of
the right of petition." Id. at § III, art. 27(2).
114 See id. at § HI, art. 28(a).
115 See id. at § III, art. 28(l)(b).
116 See id. at § IV, art. 47. The Court, however, like the Commission, has a statute of
limitations that requires the appeal to be lodged within a designated time period. See id.
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and the Commission had the right to seek relief from the Court."7  On
November 6, 1990, however, individuals were given the right to petition the
Court to review a Commission decision." 8
Operationally, the ECHR's present conflict resolution scheme is best
characterized as cumbersome. A major impediment to the system's success
is the lengthy delay that exists between the time an action is initiated and the
time it is resolved."19  Efforts to rectify this problem resulted in the
Council's adoption of Protocol No. 11.120 The remedy contained in
Protocol No. 11 is designed to streamline the adjudicatory process. When
implemented 21 the ECHR's complaint and enforcement procedures will be
1,7 See id. at § IV, art. 44.
118 See Protocol No. 9 to ECHR, Nov. 6, 1990, Europ. T.S. No. 140, arts. III-V, reprinted
in The Individual's Right to Seise the Court, 12 HuM. RTs. L.J. 51 (1991).
19 See Reform of the Control System of the European Convention on Human Rights, 14
HUM. RTs. L.J. 31, 33 (1993) (discussing the major problem that the duration of the
proceedings causes in the current control system).
0 Protocol No.11 to ECHR, May 11, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155. See Andrew
Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Principal Characteristics of the New ECHR Control
Mechanism, 15 HuM. RTs. L.J. 81 n.1 (1994); see also Reform of the Control System of the
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 119, at 31-49 (1993). The path leading
to the adoption of Protocol No. 11 began with discussions about restructuring the ECHR's
current organizational design because of the significant delays in resolving controversies. See
Henry G. Schermers, Has the European Commission of Human Rights Got Bogged Down?,
9 HuM. RTs. L.J. 175 (1988). This led to the Council adopting Recommendation 1194 which
advocated immediately reforming the ECHR's control machinery, preferably by the creation
of a permanent full-time single court. Recommendation 1194 on the reform of the control
mechanism of the European Convention on Human Rights, EUR. PARL. Ass. TEXTs ADOPTED,
44th Sess. (Oct. 6, 1992). Subsequently, the Recommendation led to the submission of
Protocol No. 11.
121 There is still an unresolved issue as to when the new scheme will be operative.
Although the Protocol opened for signature on May 11, 1994, it is not yet in force. See Italy
blocking new Euro rights court as Turkey signs up, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 11, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 2150844. The implementation of this single Court plan is already one
year behind the most pessimistic predictions, which anticipated it being operative at the end
of 1996, "at the latest." See Drzemczewski & Meyer-Ladewig, supra note 120, at 86.
Timely implementation is further frustrated because the plan cannot officially function until
all members of the Council ratify Protocol No. 11. See Protocol No. 11, supra note 120, at
art. 4. To date, all Member States, except Italy, have ratified the Protocol. See Italy blocking
new Euro rights court as Turkey signs up, supra. On October 11, 1997, the Council held a
two day summit in Strasbourg, France, and the proposed revision of the existing control
mechanism was on the agenda. See Action Plan to Strengthen Democratic Stability in the
Member States, 18 HUM. RTs. L.J. 169, 292 (1997). At the summit the Committee of
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dramatically altered. The primary modification will be to replace the two
major adjudicatory bodies, the Commission and the Court, with a single
permanent full-time European Court of Human Rights. 122  The principal
benefit this reconfiguration is anticipated to have on prisoners is to reduce
the amount of time that lapses before the controversy is resolved. 23 This
will be a tremendous improvement as conditions or actions that are
potentially violations of the rights of individuals who lack freedom will no
longer linger unremedied for long periods of time. However, given the
magnitude of this undertaking, the implementation of the revised grievance
plan "will inevitably take a considerable time."'24 Lastly, another signifi-
cant development is the decision to draft a new Protocol to the ECHR which
would exclusively address the rights of the incarcerated.'
25
2. The European Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
The European Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
were initially established pursuant to a resolution promulgated by the Council
on January 19, 1973.126 The European Prison Rules were formulated to
respond to the singular problems and situations encountered by the
imprisoned. In fact, "[the European Prison Rules] should be seen in the
context of a developing European penalty, much of it inspired by the
Ministers were directed "to take the necessary steps to set [the single court] up on 1
November 1998." Id.
122 See Protocol No. 11, supra note 120, at pmbl. and § II, art. 19; LIVINGSTONE & OWEN,
supra note 102, at 92 (discussing the single court alternative).
Protocol No. 11 does not change the individual right to petition granted in Protocol No. 9.
Thus, once Protocol No. 11 is in force, prisoners can directly petition the new European Court
of Human Rights. Protocol No. 11, supra note 120, at § II, art. 34.
" See Reform of the Control System of the European Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 119, at 31, 33-35 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of merging the
existing Commission and Court into a single adjudicatory body).
'" See id. at 32 (discussing the recently proposed operation date); see also supra note 121
(discussing the problems encountered in implementing the new scheme on schedule).
" See Recommendation 1257, supra note 11, at para. 11 (e).
': See Council of Europe, European Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners, Resolution 73(5) of the Committee of Ministers (Jan. 19, 1973).
Like the ECHR, the European Prison Rules originated as a regional adaptation of a United
Nations instrument, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. The United
Nations adopted its Resolution creating these Rules on July 31, 1957. E.S.C. Res. 663, U.N.
ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Do. E/3048 (1957).
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devastating experience of the European communities during the war of 1939-
45.91127
Eventually concerns were voiced about whether the existing European
Prison Rules adequately addressed the circumstances endured by incarcerated
individuals. In 1978 the Council decided to evaluate the feasibility of
revising the European Prison Rules. 128  This evaluation culminated in the
extensive revision of the Rules. This new version was adopted by the
Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers in February of 1987.129 One
principal feature, however, that remained unchanged was the Rules' non-
binding character. 30  Nonetheless, the penal philosophy embodied in the
European Prison Rules expresses the necessity of identifying the prisoners'
legitimate needs and maintaining humane and equitable treatment. This
philosophical stance is subject to characterization as an affirmative directive
because:
the administration of prisons must show respect for the fundamental
rights of individuals and at all times uphold the values that nourish
human dignity.13'
Although the European Prison Rules enumerate a multitude of standards
governing various aspects of prison conditions and the treatment of
prisoners, 132 the Rules also specify that these "standards merely represent
'27 Kenneth J. Neale, The European Prison Rules: Context, Philosophy and Issues, 16
PRISON INFO. BULL., (Council of Europe), June 1992, at 4, [hereinafter Neale, The European
Prison Rules: Context Philosophy and Issues]. See also Kenneth Neale, The European
Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical Aspects in MUNCIE & SPARKS, supra
note 15, at 203, 204-05 [hereinafter Neale, The European Prison Rules: Contextual
Philosophical and Practical Aspects] (discussing how the European Prison Rules comport
with the evolution of pre and post World War II prisoners' rights).
128 See Neale, The European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical
Aspects, supra note 127, at 205-06, 208.
129 See European Prison Rules, supra note 98; Neale, The European Prison Rules:
Contextual, Philosophical and Practical Aspects, supra note 127, at 217; Neale, The European
Prison Rules: Context, Philosophy and Issues, supra note 127, at 4-5.
'30 See European Prison Rules, supra note 98, at 29, Explanatory Memorandum:
Introduction (noting that "the rules have no binding legal status").
131 Neale, The European Prison Rules: Context, Philosophy and Issues, supra note 127,
at 4 (emphasis added).
132 Key provisions of the Rules require: respect for prisoners' religious beliefs;
maintenance of their health; provision of medical care; and access to adjudicatory bodies to
petition for the resolution of complaints. See European Prison Rules, supra note 98, at part
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minimum conditions."'33 The rationale for devising a scheme utilizing a
floor, as opposed to a ceiling, reflects the Council's vision that the European
Prison Rules function as an aspirational tool by providing member States
with specific standards that can be used to guide officials in the development
of domestic legislation."3 The Council's reliance on a scheme whose
basic tenets contain the minimum of what "should be followed in prison
systems"'' 35 conveys its belief that it is an effective means of guaranteeing
that incarcerated individuals obtain minimally adequate conditions of
confinement.'36 Also this structure reflects the position that imposing the
1(2), part IH(26) (religion); part 1(3), part 111 (26-32), 15, 26-32 (right to medical care); part
111(42) (right to file complaints). In terms of the traditional goals of incarceration, such as
incapacitation, specific and general deterrence, retribution, punishment and rehabilitation, the
Rules embrace the latter objective. See BRANHAM & KRANTZ, supra note 22, at 2-8;
European Prison Rules, supra note 98, at part I, 3; part IV, 65(d); LIVINGSTONE & OWEN,
supra note 102, at 97.
133 European Prison Rules, supra note 98, at pmbl. (a) (emphasis added); LIVINGSTONE
& OWEN, supra note 102, at 96. In addition, the member States are encouraged to provide
for the incarcerated in a manner that exceeds the contents of the Rules. See European Prison
Rules, supra note 98, at pmbl. (d) (a critical goal of the Rules is to "achieve the highest
realistic level of implementation beyond the basic standards").
'3 It is "[r]ecommend[ed] that the governments of member states be guided in their
internal legislation and practice by the principles set out in the text of the European Prison
Rules." European Prison Rules, supra note 98, at Introduction. Consequently, the European
Prison Rules do not purport to "constitute a model system." See European Prison Rules,
supra note 98, at pmbl. (d). This consideration and the Council's strong message to its
constituents that the Rules only supply the minimum requirements, support the conclusion that
all member States should strive to exceed the standards contained in the Rules in order to
establish and maintain "model" penal systems.
135 REYNAUD, supra note 3, at 31; see also Neale, The European Prison Rules: Context,
Philosophy and Issues, supra note 127, at 6 (stating that the success of the European Prison
Rules is dependent upon "moral authority, or political obligation").
136 Apparently the Council accurately assessed the success of this "moral authority" course
of action because "[olver the period, now more than half a century, during which the rules
have been internationally valid, they have directly, or indirectly, encouraged higher standards
and served to ensure the minimum conditions of humanity and decency in the prison
systems." European Prison Rules, supra note 98, at Explanatory Memorandum: Introduction
(emphasis added) (The Rules "impose powerful moral and political obligations on those
member states that have accepted them"). For example, France has incorporated the European
Prison Rules into the sections of domestic legislation that govern prisons. See Letter from
Professor Martine Herzog-Evans, Lecturer in Law, University of Paris-X, to Roberta M.
Harding, July 22, 1995 (on file with author); see, e.g., C. PR. PI.N., art. D 220 (1993-94)
(listing general administrative prohibitions including committing acts of violence against
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obligation to perform on the officials,'37 rather than granting prisoners
specific rights, will, in the final analysis, be an effective method for
improving the status and treatment of prisoners. 38
From the prisoner's perspective, this non-rights orientation is arguably
detrimental, or at the minimum less beneficial. Fortunately, the magnitude
of any harm that might emanate from this concern can be minimized by the
European Prison Rules' capability of positively impacting efforts to obtain
relief through the ECHR. For example, if an obligation contained in the
Rules is not performed, a confined individual can file a petition alleging that
nonperformance of that duty constitutes a violation of his or her rights under
the ECHR. 13 9 In addition, it would not be unprecedented if the ECHR's
adjudicatory body referred to the Rules for guidance in its decision-making
process.
Nonetheless, the non-binding status of the European Prison Rules could
pose a threat to the overall success of using the Rules to bestow benefits
upon imprisoned individuals.' 41 This potential consequence exists because
prisoners and using prison labor for personal reasons); cf. LIVINGSTONE & OWEN, supra note
102, at 96 (noting that while some member States have incorporated the European Prison
Rules into their domestic laws, the United Kingdom is not one of them); see also REYNAUD,
supra note 3, at 34; Neale, The European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and
Practical Aspects, supra note 127, at 211.
137 See Neale, The European Prison Rules: Context, Philosophy and Issues, supra note
127, at 6; see, e.g., European Prison Rules, supra note 98, at Explanatory Memorandum:
Introduction (noting that "one of the principal objects [of the Rules] has been to give more
emphasis to the duty of prison administrations to comply with the rules." (emphasis added));
see, e.g., Letter from Wolfgang Rau, Directorate of Legal Affairs, Council of Europe,
Division of Crime Problems, Strasbourg, France to Roberta M. Harding (November 9, 1995)
(on file with author) (explaining that the European Prison Rules non-enforceability is
consistent with the Council's objective of facilitating Member states' appreciation of the
importance of the status of prisoners' rights and how that complements the overall goal of
protecting human rights).
138 See European Prison Rules, supra note 98, at pmbl. (d).
139 See Prison Information Bulletin, supra note 127, at 6 (noting the interaction between
the non-binding European Prison Rules and the ECHR).
140 See Neale, The European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical
Aspects, supra note 127, at 203 ("the European Prison Rules are being cited as a yardstick
against which to test prison conditions"); LIVINGSTONE & OWEN, supra note 102, at 96 (the
European Prison Rules can be used to assist in the interpretation of the ECHR provisions).
4' See Neale, The European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical
Aspects, supra note 127, at 210.
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the Rules do not comprise "a catalogue of legally protected rights"'142 for
prisoners, and thus they are not legally enforceable. 43 This situation has
led to charges that the Rules' unenforceability renders them ineffective.
Consequently, it is argued that the target group-the incarcerated-is not
benefitting as envisioned by the framers. Notwithstanding this valid
criticism, the Rules do lay a foundation upon which domestic legislation
aimed at minimizing incarceration concerns can be constructed.'"
The possibility that the status of the incarcerated might be eroded rather
than advanced is minimized by the existence of another feature of the Rules:
the provision regarding the regular inspection of penal institutions.'45 The
objectives of the inspection and the subsequent reporting tasks are:
to monitor whether and to what extent these institutions are adminis-
tered in accordance with existing laws and regulations, the objectives
of the prison services and the requirements of [the European Prison
Rules].'4
Including this measure in the Rules' non-mandatory scheme should aid in
improving the status of prisoners because it encourages member states to
devise and implement an accountability system. In addition, the Rules'
effectiveness, as measured by the improved status of prisoners confined in
the member States, can be further reinforced by "inviting" member States to
submit reports every five years. Those reports describe the steps taken by
the member state to implement the recommendations contained in the
Rules. 47 In sum, the moral authority stance, the inspections, the incorpo-
ration of the Rules into domestic legislation, the increasing reliance of the
142 See REYNAUD, supra note 3, at 31; see also LIVINGSTONE & OWEN, supra note 102,
at 96.
143 See REYNAUD, supra note 3, at 32, 34 ("no public law remedy is available if one of
these minimum rules is infringed").
144 See supra note 136 (discussing the incorporation of the European Prison Rules into
domestic legislation); see also European Prison Rules, supra note 98, at Explanatory
Memorandum: Introduction (the rules, in one form or another, have had "an important
influence on the moral and practical standards that govern prison administrations").
145 See European Prison Rules, supra note 98, at part 1(4).
'4 Id. at part 1(4).
147 See LIVINGSTONE & OWEN, supra note 102, at 96. These reports are submitted to the
European Committee for Cooperation in Prison Affairs. This Committee was created by the
European Committee on Crime Problems. See id.
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ECHR's adjudicatory arm on the Rules, and the reporting requirements all
aid in transforming a formally non-mandatory program into what can in
substance be deemed a quasi-obligatory program. 48
The future of the European Prison Rules is positive. For example, the
Council of Europe's Parliament submitted a Recommendation proposing that
the European Prison Rules be revised to include "a catalogue of the rights
of the prisoner." 149 If this recommendation is pursued, it would require
enumerating the specific rights to be granted to the imprisoned. In addition,
this proposed change could be indicative of a major shift in penal philoso-
phy. For example, if the "catalogue of rights" replaces the present "duties
and obligations" posture, then the scheme's orientation would be notably
altered. An alternative view is that the recommendation to incorporate the
"rights" perspective was not made to supercede the "duty/obligation" model,
but to augment it. Whatever course of action is ultimately taken, the gravity
of the circumstances confronted by the incarcerated and the resulting need
for penal reform has been acknowledged as the Recommendation emphasizes
that "[tihe adequate implementation of the European Prison Rules should be
a matter of continuous concern."'' 50
3. The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 51 is another monumental development
148 There is a suggestion that this was the drafters "hidden agenda." See European Prison
Rules, supra note 98, at Explanatory Memorandum: Introduction (observing that the "formal
status" of the Rules disguises their substantive impact).
149 Recommendation 1257, supra note 11, at para. 11(i)(e). Two years earlier the Earl of
Dundee's requested that "the Committee of Ministers invite the governors of the member
states .. .to strictly apply the Council of Europe's Prison Rules of 12 February 1987."
Motion for a Recommendation on the improvement of prison conditions in Europe, Eur. Parl.
Ass., 44th Sess., Doc. No. 6775 at para. 7 (1993) [hereinafter Motion for a Recommendation].
150 Recommendation 1257, supra note 11, at para. 10 (emphasis added). The Council also
adopted another resolution that strengthens the position of those confined in penal facilities.
This proposal advocates the implementation of policies to develop and institute educational
programs for the imprisoned. Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (89) of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States on education in prison at paras. 12, 13 (Strasbourg,
Oct. 13, 1989). This program is consistent with the Rules' rehabilitation, or reintegration,
goal.
'5' ECPT, supra note 97.
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in the evolution of the rights of those confined in Europe. Like the ECHR
and the European Prison Rules, the decision to enact the ECPT was partially
inspired by an existing United Nations initiative.1 52 It also was precipitated
by the Council's commitment to "promot[ing] adherence to the provisions
of Article 3 of the [ECHR],"'153 which prohibits subjecting anyone "to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 1 54  This
objective incorporates two of the ECPT's central tenets. First, the Council's
intention that the ECPT augment the ECHR155 by providing another way
to achieve the ECHR's goals 156 is demonstrated by the critical role Article
3157 plays in implementing the ECPT. Second, the jurisprudence devel-
oped in connection with Article 3 of the ECHR will be used to enhance the
performance of the ECPT because it will "provide the [ECPT] Committee
with a point of reference for its consideration of situations liable to give rise
to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. ' 8 In sum,
the Council's principal objective was to devise a mechanism that would
enable the synergistic effect of these two instruments to facilitate improve-
ments in custodial situations.
The key procedure selected to accomplish this goal was to grant the
Committee for the Prevention of Torture [hereinafter CPT] the power to
periodically inspect the member States' institutions that fall within the
152 See id. at Explanatory Report, 1(2), (5); see also LIVINGSTONE & OWEN, supra note
102, at 93.
113 ECPT, supra note 97, at pmbl.
" ECHR, supra note 93, at I, art. 3. "IT]he Committee's activities are aimed at future
prevention [of the violation of rights] rather than the application of legal requirements to
existing circumstances." ECPT, supra note 97, at Explanatory Report, IV(27); see also id.
at II(12)-(13).
155 See ECPT, supra note 97, at pmbl., Explanatory Report, I(7)-(10); see also, Malcom
Evans & Rod Morgan, The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture: Operational
Practice, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 590, 591-93 (1992) (discussing the interrelationship between
the ECHR and the ECPT).
156 See ECPT, supra note 97, at ch. IV, art. 17(2), Explanatory Report, 1(13).
157 See ECHR, supra note 93, at art. 3 (prohibits subjecting prisoners to torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment).
"s ECPT, supra note 97, at Explanatory Report, IV(22). The decisional law developed
by the Court of Human Rights from adjudicating cases involving Article 3 controversies
"provides a source of guidance for the Committee [for the Prevention of Torture]," ECPT,
supra note 97, at Explanatory Report, IV(27), in the performance of its duties.
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ECPT's jurisdiction. 5 9 This fundamental feature of the ECPT communi-
cates the Council's position that a non-judicial tool--the regular inspection
of institutions by a committee composed of qualified individuals--can
effectively supplement efforts to improve the conditions and status of
individuals deprived of their liberty."6  This operational preference is
confirmed in the following statement made by the CPT:
At the outset it might be useful to recall the essence of the CPT's
mandate. The Committee's task is to examine the treatment of persons
deprived of their liberty, with a view to strengthening, if necessary, the
protection of such persons from torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment .... The CPT's activities are based on the
concept of co-operation .... The Committee's role is not to publicly
criticise States, but rather to assist them in finding ways of enhancing
the protection of persons deprived of their liberty from ill-treat-
ment. 61
Given that these inspections are critical to the scheme's success, determining
the scope of the ECPT becomes a critical threshold issue.
The CPT is authorized to visit "any place within its jurisdiction where
persons are deprived of their liberty by a public authority."' 62 Since penal
facilities deprive individuals of their freedom, they conform to this
description; and thus, the ECPT's jurisdiction extends to them. Additional
support for this conclusion is found by examining the types of facilities
inspected by the CPT. Penal facilities constitute the majority of the
'59 ECPT, supra note 97, at ch. I, art. I; Evans & Morgan, supra note 155, at 590;
LIVINGSTONE & OwEN, supra note 102, at 94. The ECPT states that "[elach Party shall
permit visits." ECPT, supra note 97, at ch. I, art. 2 (emphasis added).
'60 ECPT, supra note 97, at pmbl. and Explanatory Report, II(15), (17). This
preventative posture is also expressed in the statement that "the Committee's activities are
aimed at future prevention [of the violation of rights] rather than the application of legal
requirements to existing circumstances." ECPT, supra note 97, at Explanatory Report,
IV(27).
16' Council of Europe, European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Second General Report, CPT/Inf (92)3, at para. 1
(Strasbourg, Apr. 13, 1992) [hereinafter CPT, 2nd General Report] (emphasis added); see also
ECPT, supra note 97, at Explanatory Report, 111(20), IV(33)(34).
162 ECPT, supra note 97, at ch. I, art. H.
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institutions inspected by the CPT. 16 3  These facilities include pre-trial
holding facilities, such as jails or remand centers, and prisons confining
individuals convicted of criminal offenses.' 64 The ECPT also applies to
administrative detention facilities used to detain aliens. 165
The ECPT operates in a simple fashion. 66  There are two primary
components: the visit to the facility and the report prepared subsequently.
After a mandatory visit is completed, the CPT is required to prepare a report
summarizing its findings and recommending how conditions can, if
necessary, be improved. 167  The report is a vital feature of the scheme
since the CPT's comments contained within it are designed to ensure that the
rights guaranteed to prisoners by Article 3 of the ECHR are not violated.
Since the ECPT relies upon non-judicial intervention 168 as the exclusive
means of identifying, addressing, and resolving the problems associated with
those who are imprisoned, these periodic visits are immensely important.
The terms of the Convention require the Committee to periodically visit
facilities in the member States. 69  However, the ECPT and the CPT's
Rules of Procedure are silent on the frequency of the visits. 70  An
examination of the CPT's existing visitation practice reveals that it has
already established a regular visitation schedule. The sequence of the CPT's
initial periodic visits to the signatory Members' institutions established the
'63 Evans & Morgan, supra note 155, at 603 (observing how the majority of the CPT
visits have been to facilities connected to the criminal justice system).
"6 See CPT, 2nd General Report, supra note 161, at paras. 43-60 (discussing a variety
of issues pertaining to the treatment of prisoners in such facilities).
'65 See CPT, 2nd General Report, supra note 161, at para. 4; ECPT, supra note 97, at
Explanatory Report, IV. 28-32.
" For a detailed description of how the ECPT functions see Evans & Morgan, supra note
155, at 594-614; see also LIVINGSTONE & OWEN, supra note 102, at 94-96.
167 See ECPT, supra note 97, ch. Il, art. 10(1); Council of Europe, European Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Rules of
Procedure, CPT/Inf (91)8 at tit. IV, ch. I, rule 41(1) (Strasbourg, Sept. 20, 1991) [hereinafter
CPT, Rules of Procedure]. This report is sent to the State whose facilities were inspected.
See CPT, Rules of Procedure, supra. Furthermore, "the Committee and the Party may hold
consultations concerning in particular the implementation of any recommendations set out in
the report." CPT, Rules of Procedure, supra, at tit. IV, ch. I, rule 43. art. 10(1).
'6s See infra pp. 35-36.
169 See ECPT, supra note 97, at ch. III, art. 7(1); CPT, Rules of Procedure, supra note
167, at tit. III, ch. I, rule 31(1).
170 See CPT, Rules of Procedure, supra note 167.
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basis for arranging the subsequent periodic visits. 7 ' The CPT also has the
power to conduct ad hoc visits. 72 Visits of this nature typically occur if
a grave situation is brought to the CPT's attention. 73 This type of visit
also functions as a potent "moral suasion" tool in the ECPT's arsenal of
compliance weapons.
One drawback of the ECPT's exclusive reliance on a non-judicial
inspection and report model is that the CPT is limited to offering recommen-
dations for improvements rather than imposing formal penalties for "non-
compliance."'' 74 This feature could frustrate achieving the ECPT's major
objectives-the strengthening of prisoners' rights and the improvement of
prison conditions-because the absence of a penalty or a formal enforcement
mechanism could potentially reduce a State's motivation to correct what the
CPT has opined are inadequate conditions or violations of the rights of the
detained.
Fortunately, the ECPT has a tool at its disposal that can overcome this
shortcoming. As previously noted, the report prepared by the CPT
subsequent to the visit usually includes suggestions on actions the State can
'7' See CPT, Rules of Procedure, supra note 167, at tit. III, ch. I, rule 31(2). For
example, during 1994, the CPT made its second periodic visit to the United Kingdom,
Austria, and Spain. See Council of Europe, European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Fifth General Report on CPT's
Activities, CPT/Inf (95)10 at para. 1 (Strasbourg, July 3, 1995) [hereinafter CPT, 5th General
Report]. The first periodic visits to the United Kingdom and Austria were made in 1990.
Thus, there was a four year interval between the periodic visits. The CPT's first periodic visit
to Spain occurred in 1991, which resulted in a three year interval. See Council of Europe,
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, First General Report on CPT's Activities, CPT (91)3 at para. 54 (Strasbourg,
Feb. 20, 1991) [hereinafter CPT, 1st General Report]. See also CPT, 2nd General Report,
supra note 161, at para. 9. This data suggests that the periodic visits will be scheduled
approximately every three to four years. Given the time necessary to prepare the report, have
the CPT adopt the report, submit the report to the State, give the Party/Member State time
to respond to the report and adopt any of the CPT's recommendations, it is more realistic to
assume that a four year visitation cycle will be adopted.
172 See ECPT, supra note 97, at ch. III, art. 7(1); CPT, Rules of Procedure, supra note
167, at tit. IlI, ch. I, rule 32(1).
173 For example, the CPT conducted two ad hoc visits to Turkish penal facilities because
it had been notified that Turkish police officials were abusing detainees. The first ad hoc
visit occurred from September 9 to September 21, 1990, and the second from September 29
to October 7, 1991. See CPT, 2nd General Report, supra note 164, at para. 17.
174 See LIVINGSTONE & OWEN, supra note 102, at 96 (noting that the CPT has no
enforcement power).
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take to remedy the inadequacies. 175  "If the Party fails to co-operate or
refuses to improve the situation in light of the Committee's recommenda-
tions, the Committee may decide ... to make a public statement on the
matter." 176 While this "sanction" does not possess any legal enforcement
power, it is a form of public condemnation which can subject a nation to
unwanted international scrutiny. This ability to expose a nation to the global
community can transform the public condemnation tool into a powerful
sanction which ultimately aids in the task of "persuading" a State to comply
with the CPT's suggestions. Therefore, any imperfections in the scheme
predicated on the absence of a formal judicial enforcement mechanism can
be successfully overcome by publicly denouncing a nation for its treatment
of individuals whose liberty it has deprived.
The CPT's experience with the Prefecture de la Police de Paris in Paris,
France 77 illustrates the potential for using ad hoc visits and public state-
75 See ECPT, supra note 97, at ch. HI, art. 10().
176 ECPT, supra note 97, at ch. III, art. 10(2); see also Evans & Morgan, supra note 155,
at 609 (noting that the public statement mechanism is the only "sanction" available under the
ECPT).
The action taken by the CPT with respect to the situation in Turkey aptly illustrates how
public condemnation vis-a-vis publication functions as a compliance or enforcement tool.
Two ad hoc visits were made to a Turkish penal facility. See CPT, 2nd General Report,
supra note 161, at para. 17 (noting that the first ad hoc visit occurred from September 9-21,
1990 and the second from September 29 to October 7, 1991). Subsequently, the CPT
admonished Turkey to rectify its dismal prison conditions. The Turkish government,
however, refused to take heed of the recommendations. Ultimately, the CPT voted to issue
a statement informing the public of its findings that Turkey was torturing and severely
mistreating individuals held in police custody. The public statement was published on
December 15, 1992. See Council of Europe, European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Third General Report, CPT/Inf
(93)12 at para. 9 (Strasbourg, June 4, 1993) [hereinafter CPT, 3rd General Report]. A second
public statement against Turkish penal practices was issued on December 6, 1996. See
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CPT), Strasbourg, Public Statement on Turkey, issued on 6 December 1996,
reprinted in 18 HuM. RTS. L.J. 169, 294-96 (1997).
'77 The Prefecture de la Police de Paris will be referred to as the "Depot." A depot is
equivalent to a jail. See WEST'S LAW AND COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY IN FIVE LANGUAGES
449 (Rolando Epstein et al., eds. 1985). It is a facility that typically holds detenus, or pre-
trial detainees, garde a vues, individuals who are being interrogated but have not yet been
arrested or charged, and retenues, foreigners held under administrative detention. See
Interview with Professor Martine Herzog-Evans, Lecturer in Law, University of Paris-X, in
Jayat, France (July 28, 1997) (notes on file with author); see also supra note 6 (discussing
the difference between prisons and jails in the United States).
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ments to force compliance by the member States. During the fall of 1991,
the CPT conducted its first periodic inspection of French facilities. 7 ' The
Depot in Paris was among those visited. 179  The CPT's Report to the
French government included the following general observations and
conclusions about the Depot: the conditions under which garde a vue
detainees 8° were held needed improvement,' 8 ' and the conditions of the
section used to house male detainees, detenus, were mediocre. 82  More
specific concerns included: the failure to meet the garde a vue detainees'
nutritional needs; 83 the failure to issue blankets to regularly housed
detainees; u the inadequacy of toilet facilities, which consisted of a hole
located in the middle of the cell floor; 8 5 the continued infestation of
bugs; 86 the unsatisfactory sanitation system (partially due to the physical
location of the toilets); and problems with access to a physician., 87
The CPT expressed greater trepidation about the "Centre de Re'tention du
Depot," the Depot's administrative detention center for foreigners. One
recurring complaint was that those held in administrative detention were
mistreated, including being physically abused by the guards. 88  Another
widespread allegation was that these detainees were forcibly tranquilized
before leaving the country. 18 ' The CPT was also very troubled by the
178 The institutions were inspected from October 27, 1991 until November 8, 1991. CPT,
2nd General Report, supra note 161, at para. 17.
179 See id. at Appendix 3.
"s Garde a vue detainees are individuals who are confined prior to being formally
charged with a criminal offense. See Interview with Professor Martine Herzog-Evans,
Lecturer in Law, University of Paris-X, in Jayat, France (July 28, 1997).
'81 See Council of Europe, Rapport au Gouvernement De La Republique Francaise R6latif
A La Visite Effectude Par Le Comit6 Europden Pour La Prdvention De La Torture Et Dest
Peines Ou Traitements Inhumains Ou Ddgradants (CPT) En France Du 27 Octobre Au 8
Novembre 1991 Et Response Du Gouvernement De La Republique Francaise, CPT/Inf (93)2
at para. 26 (Strasbourg, Jan. 19, 1993) (French version) [hereinafter First French Report and
Response].
182 See id. at para. 28.
183 See id. at para. 30.
'8' See id. at para. 28. The French prison officials claimed that blankets were not
distributed because they posed a risk of being used by the prisoners to commit suicide. Id.
185 See id.
'86 See id.
187 See id. at para. 43-44.
188 See id. at para. 68.
"' See id. at para. 69.
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"gravely deficient" living environment because it was filthy and un-
healthy.' 9° Additional distressful observations made by the CPT included:
the lack of outdoor exercise; the overcrowded cells; the sub-standard quality
of the cells and cell furnishings; the absence of necessary toiletries (soap,
towels, etc.) for some of the detainees; and the failure to provide these
individuals with a change of clothing.' 9' It was also noted that the
infestation of bugs was worse than that observed in the regular male
quarters. 9 2 Accordingly, the CPT's report included recommendations on
how France could remedy this situation so that the conditions would not
violate Article 3 of the ECHR. Finally, the CPT advised the French
government to modernize these antiquated facilities and to make more
programs available to these detainees. 193 Emphasizing the gravity of the
situation, as well as the corresponding need for immediate action, the CPT
recommended that the French government give the necessary remodeling of
the detention center "the most highest priority."' 94
In its response to the CPT's report,1 95 the French government advised
the CPT that it had already implemented some of the recommendations
contained in the report. For example, the government cited an improvement
in satisfying the garde a vue detainees' nutritional needs, the installation of
additional telephones to assist the detainees in accessing family, friends, and
'9 See id. at para. 70.
'9' See id. at para. 71.
192 See id.
193 See id. at para. 72.
"9 See id.
'95 The report prepared by the CPT remains confidential unless the State requests the
publication of the report. See ECPT, supra note 97, at ch. El, art. 11(1)-(3); CPT Rules of
Procedure, supra note 167, at tit. IV, ch. I, rule 41(3), 42(1). And, although publication is
not mandatory, the trend appears to be that most states request publication. See CPT, 5th
General Report, supra note 171, at para. 11 (noting that since the majority of the States have
consented to publication of the reports, this seems to be the norm).
Following this general practice the French government agreed to the publication of the
report and its response to the report. See Council of Europe, European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Fourth General
Report on the CPT's Activities, CPT/Inf (94)10 at para. 9 (Strasbourg, Aug. 10, 1994)
[hereinafter CPT, 4th General Report]. Republique Frangaise, Rapport De Suivi Du
Gouvernement Frangaise En Response Au Rapport Du Comite Europeen Pour La Prevention
De La Torture Et Des Peines Ou Traitements Inhumains Ou Degradants Relatifs A Sa Visite




attorneys, and the placement of a television in the detention room, satisfying
the "programming" recommendation.'96 The Government also noted that
it had explored renovating the sanitation and electrical systems.'9 7 As for
the CPT's concerns about the living conditions of the administrative
detainees, the French government stated that these problems were primarily
due to overcrowding. 9 Presumably, this meant that they could not be
remedied.
Given the gravity of the situation and the lack of initiative by the French
government, the CPT decided to conduct an ad hoc inspection of the Depot
from July 20, 1994 until July 23, 1994. 9 In the report sent to the French
government on September 21, 1994 the CPT reiterated its concerns
pertaining to the conditions to which the administrative detainees were
subjected. 200 The letter accompanying the report advised the French
government that it had six months within which to respond to the report
regarding the adoption of the CPT's recommendations. 20 1 The government
transmitted its Response to the Report on the Ad Hoc Visit on April 19,
1995.202 The government's response described its proposal for renovating
the Depot's administrative detention center.20 a Six days later, on April
24th, the Depot was unexpectedly closed for complete renovations.2 In
a subsequent letter to the CPT, the French government stated that it
'9 See Rapport De Suivi, supra note 195, at para. 122.
See id. The renovations were estimated to cost 7,000,000 French Francs. Id.
See Republique Franqaise, Observations Du Gouvernement Frangaise En Response Au
Rapport Du Comite Europeen Pour La Prevention De La Torture Et Des Peines Ou
Traitements Inhumains Ou Degradants Relatif A Sa Visite En France Du 27 Octobre Au 8
Novembre 1991, at para. 68 [hereinafter Observations Du Frangals].
'99 See CPT, 5th General Report, supra note 171, at 4, § L.A, para. 2. The CPT noted that
this second visit to France was intentionally directed at the Depot de la Prefecture de Police
in Paris, "which had previously been visited in the course of a periodic visit." Id.
0 See Council of Europe, Rapport au Gotivernement de la Republique francaise relatif
h la visite effectude par le Comitd europden pur la prdvention de la torture et des peines ou
traitements inhumains ou degradants (CPT) en France du 20 au .22 juillet et rrponse du
Gouvemement de la Rdpublique frangaise, CPT/Inf (96)2 at para. 14 (Strasbourg, Jan. 23,
1996) (French version) [hereinafter Second French Report and Response].
201 See id. at 9. This would require the French government to respond on or before March
21, 1995.
2w See id. at 21.
o See id. at 24.
0 See Philippe Bernard, Le Comit6 europden contre la torture avait constat6 des
'traitements inhumains' au 'depot' de Paris, LE MONDE, April 28, 1995, at 13.
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anticipated reopening the detainment center in the.spring of 1996.205 The
Depot has yet to reopen.2°6
Despite the CPT's strongly worded Report covering the first periodic visit,
the Government relied on prison overcrowding as a justification for not
implementing the most important of the CPT's recommendations. 20 7 This
suggests that the French government's position was that the existence of this
"external" contributory factor-the burgeoning prison population--over
which it had no control, exempted it from deploying the resources necessary
to remedy the "grave deficiencies" noted by the CPT. Thus, arguably, the
CPT's decision to conduct an ad hoc visit of the Depot's administrative
detention section shortly after the government submitted its supplemental
responses and observations to the First Report and the time lapses that
existed between the pertinent events influenced the French government's
decision to close the facility. 208 As a result, ad hoc visits have an enforce-
ment dimension because they can exert sufficient pressure on the state so
that it will take corrective action.
While a public statement was not formally issued, the press coverage2°9
of the incident is in substance equivalent to the issuance of a public
statement by the CPT. Thus, the adverse publicity that a state receives when
it is disclosed to the public that the CPT "suspects" that the state is engaging
in activities that violate Article 3 of the ECHR can, as it did here, perform
a remedial function. In sum, the situation resulting in the closure of the
Paris Depot is illustrative of how the ad hoc visitation system can operate
and how the mere possibility that a public statement of condemnation will
be issued can generate a sufficient amount of domestic and international
"5 See Second French Report and Response, supra note 200, at 5.
206 See Interview with Professor Martine Herzog-Evans, Lecturer in Law, University of
Paris-X, in Jayat, France (July 28, 1997).
2 See Observations Du Francais, supra note 198, at para. 68.
" The First French Report was published on January 19, 1993 and contained the French
government's responses. See First French Report and Response, supra note 181. The French
government supplemented its initial response in January of 1994. See Observations Du
Francais, supra note 198. The ad hoc visit was conducted approximately seven months later.
See CPT, 5th General Report, supra note 171, at para. 2.
2 See Philippe Bernard, supra note 204. It warrants noting that discussions were held
regarding whether the CPT should vote to issue a public statement. But, the French
government closed the facility before any formal action could be taken. See Interview with




pressure to facilitate the ECPT in successfully achieving its mission.210
On the horizon are additional efforts to reinforce the ECPT's mission. For
example, when the Council's Parliamentary Assembly met in 1993, a motion
was made recommending that the Council's Committee of Ministers "invite
the governments of the member states ... to implement the recommenda-
tions of the [ECPT]. 21' While this motion falls short of suggesting that
it would be mandatory for member States to implement the CPT's recom-
mendations for improvements, it does suggest that the member states should
voluntarily adopt the recommendations. At a later date, the Parliamentary
Assembly did adopt a Recommendation to "reinforce the structures and
increase the resources of the [ECPT]. 2 12  Although this portion of the
Recommendation does not specify what action will be taken, its positive
language conveys the message that the ECPT will assume an even more
active role in bettering penal conditions in Europe.213
III. COMPARING THE DEVELOPMENT AND STATUS OF PRISONERS' RIGHTS
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
A striking feature of the development of prisoners' rights in both
jurisdictions is the impact the reform movements of the 18th century had on
improving prison conditions. This result was largely due to the efforts of
John Howard, an Englishman who was the Sheriff of Bedford in England.
During the eighteenth century Howard traveled extensively in England and
on the Continent, observed the conditions at correctional institutions in these
locales, and commented on the differences.21 a His forays culminated in his
authorship of the seminal book, The State of Prisons, in which he strenuous-
ly advocates for improving conditions of prisoners' confinement.2 5 The
210 As previously noted, a public statement was actually released in the situation involving
a Turkish prison. See supra note 176. However, this year the CPT reviewed its concerns
with the treatment by French police of "detained persons and the living conditions they must
endure." See Prisoners 'Abused' in France, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 15, 1998. A
public statement may be looming on the horizon for France.
211 Motion for a Recommendation, supra note 149.
212 Recommendation 1257, supra note 11, at para. 1 l(vi).
213 See generally Rod Morgan, Convention Improves European Prisons, OVERCROWDED
TIMEs, Dec. 1993, at 1, 5 (discussing the ECPT's positive effect on the prison situation in
Europe).
214 See HOWARD, supra note 15.
215 See id.
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influence of his book crossed the Atlantic and exerted a tremedous influence
on the Friends', or Quakers', involvement with the prison reform move-
ment. 16 Jeremy Bentham2" 7 was also an active participant in penal
reform activities during this period. His most notable contribution was the
development of a holistic penal methodology that culminated in the creation
of the Panoptican. 2" A critical facet of Bentham's Panoptican scheme
concentrated on the interaction between the authoritative power of architec-
ture and the reformation of inmates.2 9  He also believed that the general
conditions of confinement needed significant improvement.220
Despite these good intentions, by 1850, the correctional reform movement,
which emphasized rehabilitation, had accomplished minimal substantive
changes.22' Ironically, the campaign's major accomplishment was to
legitimize a prison system that remained relatively inhumane. This outcome
was due to the combined adverse effects of overcrowding, judicial indiffer-
ence to the administration of prisons, and inadequate staffing.222 Indeed,
in the 1850's the general consensus was that since the theory of reforming
inmates was discredited, prisons could, and should, be cruel to deter future
criminal activity.223
216 See Morris & Rothman, supra note 18, at 89-91.
217 Jeremy Bentham was an 18th century British philosopher known primarily for his "the
greatest good for the greatest number" utilitarian writings. He was also a critic of the legal
system in general, and the justice system in particular. See SEMPLE, supra note 91, at 20-23.
218 See SEMPLE, supra note 91, at 9-13; FOUCAULT, supra note 18, at 200-28 (critiquing
Bentham's proposal).
219 See SEMPLE, supra note 91, at 114-22. The Stateville Prison at Joliet, Illinois, is an
example of Bentham's panoptican. To Bentham's distress, a genuine Panoptican prison was
never built in England. See id. at 313; see also Morris & Rothman, supra note 18, at 274-75
(discussing Bentham's frustration when his plan for a Panoptican at New South Wales was
thwarted).
22 See SEMPLE, supra note 91, at 112-22.
2 See Morris & Rothman, supra note 18, at 105.
222 See id. at 104.
223 See id. at 105. Some positive strides, however, were taken toward revamping penal
practices during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, at penal
reformer Zebulon Brockway's urging a penal policy directed at reformation resulted in the
establishment of the Elvira Reformatory in upstate New York. Brockway's vision "combined
indeterminate sentencing and release on parole with an institutional commitment to
educational programs." Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965,
in MORRIS & ROTHMAN, supra note 18, at 169, 174; see also id at 70-176 (describing the
status of prison conditions and penal policies during the late nineteenth century).
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With the advent of the 20th century, fundamental differences with respect
to the status and rights of the confined began to become evident between the
approaches followed by the two jurisdictions. By this time, the "slave of the
state" doctrine was firmly entrenched in the United States. 24 This princi-
ple represents more of a regression rather than a progression. The situation
in Europe was not as dire.225 While inmates there undoubtedly experi-
enced a decline in conditions, their plight was not as deplorable as that of the
penal fraternity in the United States. The absence of contract labor and
prison farm schemes, schemes which dominated the penal systems in the
226United States, was a key factor contributing to the relatively better
position occupied by the European prisoners. The end of World War II,
however, narrowed the disparity between the paths followed by the
respective jurisdictions. The significance of this event was emphasized by
Europe's intense desire to adopt and implement regional public law
instruments establishing and respecting human rights.227 This leads to one
of the most notable points pertaining to how the evolution of the rights of
the imprisoned in the two jurisdictions differed, namely, the distinction
between form and substance.
During this time, Europe acquired a heightened awareness of the rights of
incarcerated individuals. A similar shift occurred in state prisons in the
United States, as the mid-to late 1940's marked the renunciation of the
"slave of the state" position and the endorsement of the "hands-off' doctrine.
At the minimum, these actions formally represented an advancement in the
penal policies in both geographic locations. Since the "hands-off' approach
recognized that prisoners were no longer "slaves of the state," then, arguably,
its implementation should have triggered a noticeable change in the
substance of penal policies. However, this was not the case. Instead, form
22' See supra pp. 8-9 (discussing the "slave of the state" phase in the development of
prisoners' rights in the United States); but see Rotman, supra note 223, at 178-85 (discussing
a few of the advancements in the American penal system such as greater interest in the
psychotherapeutic model of prison reform).
225 See Morris & Rothman, supra note 18, at 221-22 (discussing the leniency and reforms
of various European systems).
226 See supra pp. 8-9 and notes 24-27 (discussing incarceration under the contract and
penal farm labor systems).
227 See supra pp. 21-22 (describing the creation of Council of Europe conventions that
address human rights); see also MARK W. JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
TEXT AND MATERIALS 14-25 (1995) (describing the human rights concerns addressed by the
drafters of the ECHR).
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rather than substance prevailed as the status of prisoners remained fundamen-
tally unaltered: universally conditions remained miserable.
In contrast, Europe's progress exceeded that of mere "formal" develop-
ment. The legal rules adopted by Europe generated appreciable changes in
the attitudes, principles, and philosophy pertaining to the implementation of
correctional policies. Thus, although the jurisdictions acknowledged the
existence of problems with the plight of prisoners, a profound variance
existed with respect to the manner by which the detained were treated in
each local. Another critical distinction flows from this evolutionary
difference.
Europe's more aggressive progress in this area could support the
conclusion that it would be more likely to formulate its methodology in
terms of bestowing "rights" upon the imprisoned; instead the prevailing
European perspective confers duties or obligations on the prison offi-
cials.228 On the other hand, the United States, once it began dismantling
the constraints imposed by the "hands-off' approach, employed a "rights"
perspective towards the treatment of prisoners. 229  Facially this suggests
that there is another crucial difference in the approaches implemented by the
two jurisdictions. The "rights" orientation appears to provide prisoners with
greater protection because it embodies the affirmative grant of rights. In
contrast, under the "duty/obligation" methodology, the European prisoner
arguably fares worse than his American counterpart because he does not
actually possess a "right." However, after conducting a more scrutinizing
assessment, the "duty/obligation" method in practice might actually
accomplish more than the "rights" methodology in terms of improving and
maintaining the quality of the conditions of detention. Consequently, the
individual incarcerated in Europe would receive more tangible benefits
placing him in a position better than that of the prisoner in the United States.
First, the "duty/obligation" scheme immediately notifies prison officials of
their affirmative duty to perform or refrain from performing specific acts.
This scheme instantly places the burden of performance on the prison
228 An illustration of this methodology is found in the ECHR which contains an
affirmative directive that: "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." ECHR, supra note 93, at § I, art. 3 (emphasis added). The
European Prison Rules, supra note 98, and the ECPT, supra note 97, are similarly oriented.
Instances do exist, however, where the issue is presented in terms of individual rights. For
example, the ECHR states that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion." ECHR, supra note 93, at § I, art. 9(1).
2 See Appendix A.
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officials. Consequently, the European prisoner does not have to wait to
exercise his or her rights in order to obtain what has been promised. In
contrast, the "rights" approach operates from the other end of the continuum.
Typically some event occurs, usually involving the actual or threatened
deprivation of a "right," that triggers the need to establish that the right was
not recognized or respected. The burden then falls on the inmate to initiate
an action if he or she believes that prison officials have violated or will
violate that right.23°
Although the "duty/obligation" and "rights" orientations highlight a
significant distinction between how the jurisdictions appreciate, examine and
respond to prisoner issues, common features exist. For example, 1962 was
a hallmark year for prisoners on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United
States, the Supreme Court expressly approved the extension of the Eighth
Amendment to the states.23 ' This same year the Court of Human Rights
acted similarly by declaring that the ECHR applied to detainees in penal
facilities.232  Interestingly, the words of the provisions are similar. The
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids the infliction of
"cruel and unusual punishments, "233 while Article 3 of the "ECHR bars
subjecting an inmate to torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment.3 Since both statements reflect concerns about the ill-
treatment of prisoners, their minimum objective is to ensure that the penally
confined are not tortured or otherwise physically abused. These judicial
actions suggest an enhanced sensitivity to the status of the imprisoned.
230 Of course, one can always argue that the proffered distinction between "rights" and
"duty/obligation" is a sham. It can be argued that they are substantively identical; in essence,
simply two sides of the same coin. If an inmate has a "right," then someone, here prison
officials, has a duty to respect that right and to act in accordance with the right. Nonetheless,
there could be a psychological dimension that validates the potential impact the
"rights"/"duty" distinction could have on the quality of prison life. If prison employees are
informed that their job responsibilities include providing specific services and treatment, then
they are more likely to perform these tasks, even though they benefit their charges. It simply
becomes "part of the job." In contrast, under the "rights" orientation theory more resistance
might be encountered because of beliefs that: 1) prison personnel are under no obligation to
provide whatever is required to satisfy the "right"; and 2) prisoners have, or should not have,
"rights." This in turn could influence the status of the conditions of confinement.
2" See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
232 See Koch v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 1962 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 126 (Eur. Ct.
H.R.).
233 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (1791) (emphasis added).
2 ECHR, supra note 93, at art. 3.
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Despite this common positive foundation, the respective systems ultimately
took relatively divergent paths. A critical factor leading to this separation
is that the ban in Article 3 encompasses actions and activities that qualify as
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.235 Thus, comparatively,
the scope of Article 3 is broader and consequently bars a greater variety of
negative actions directed at prisoners than does the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, Article 3 has the potential of extending greater protection than
that supplied by its American counterpart, the Eighth Amendment.
Remedial issues present another striking dissimilarity between the two
regimes. Historically, the United States has used a singularly distinct
coercive remedial scheme to resolve disputes in this context.236 Initially,
the federal judiciary refused to adjudicate these controversies. However,
with the passage of time and the transformation of public and judicial
sentiment, the tribunals eventually became the primary forum for the
resolution of prisoner complaints.237 Resolution is typically accompanied
by a request for an injunction or a coercive equitable remedy that forces
prison officials to perform or refrain from performing specified acts."' In
addition, the prevailing tendency to resort to the court system means that the
adversarial model of litigation 23 controls how the proceedings are conduct-
ed. The evolution of the European system discloses a different situation.
While the wholesale rejection of the "traditional" litigation model in this
context did not occur, there is an easily discernable preference for employing
non-coercive remedies and non-confrontational means of resolving the
problem. The ECPT is a prime example of this predilection. When
promoting the ECPT, the Council went to great lengths to stress that it
would operate pursuant to a non-judicial, non-coercive process for addressing
and rectifying issues related to prisoners. In fact, this stance has resulted in
23s id.
2 See supra note 48 (mentioning the tremendous number of U.S. jurisdictions operating
penal facilities under court orders or consent degrees). Even with the passage of the PLRA
the remedial status quo remains unaltered. See PLRA, supra note 84.
23' See Appendix A. This is not to say that grievances filed by prisoners are not resolved
by other bodies, such as internal administrative grievance panels.
238 See Status Report: State Prisons and the Courts, supra note 48 (listing the number
of U.S. jurisdictions under consent decrees or injunctions in prison conditions cases).
239 The adversarial model is a traditional characteristic of the American judicial dispute
resolution mechanism. See JOHN J. CouND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES AND
MATERIALS 2 (7th ed. 1997).
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the ECPT being criticized for lacking a formal coercive compliance tool. 2 °
Nonetheless, the Council forged ahead with its prescription of "inspection
and recommendations" as an effective means of generating change and
improvement in the prisons. The European Prison Rules share this feature.
They were specifically developed and implemented with the objective of
being non-mandatory. Rather than imposing them, the member States are
"encouraged" to adopt them. This further reflects adherence to the principle
that positive changes are more likely to occur if made voluntarily. The
validity of this precept has been confirmed as some member States, such as
France, have incorporated some or all of the European Prison Rules into their
domestic legislation. 24' The ECHR is the Council instrument that is closest
to replicating the coercive, remedial techniques resorted to in the United
States. As previously discussed, the ECHR presently has two adjudicatory
bodies: the Commission and the Court.242 Despite this surface similarity,
the ECHR's adjudicatory arm possesses attributes that render it significantly
distinct from its U.S. counterpart. First, and foremost, is the ECHR's
emphasis on facilitating the parties' endeavors to reach a consensus.243
Presumably, this accord will be mutually satisfactory as the ECHR
specifically requires a "friendly settlement. ''244  So, at least initially, the
tribunal procedures differ from those in the United States because of the
absence, or reduction, of having an acutely confrontational tone to the
proceedings.
The development of prisoners' rights in Europe also includes a strong
preference for establishing uniformity in the rules and practices among its
members. 245  Encouraging member States to incorporate the ECHR's
provisions into their domestic legislation is one method selected to achieve
240 However, it should be noted that the ad hoc visits and the issuance of public
statements can function, through their "moral suasion" powers, as strong and effective
informal coercive tools. See supra pp. 35-41 and notes 177 & 181 (discussing the situations
at the French Depot and the Turkish penal facility).
24 See supra note 139.
242 See supra p. 23 (describing the organization of the ECHR). The proposal contained
in Protocol No. I I will concentrate the adjudicatory powers into a single court, the Court of
Human Rights. See supra note 120.
243 After the prisoner's petition is accepted by the Commission, the immediate objective
is to facilitate a resolution between the parties. See supra p. 24 (discussing the "friendly
settlement" objective).
24 See ECHR, supra note 93, at § III, art. 28(1)(b).
243 See Guarnieri, supra note 106, at 14.
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this goal.2' This objective is also satisfied when member states incorpo-
rate the non-mandatory European Prison Rules into domestic regulations. 247
The ECPT inspection and reporting requirements also assist in attaining the
uniformity goal. These regular visits to the members' penal institutions
facilitate the CPT in formulating acceptable standards for conditions of
248confinement and other issues pertaining to prisoners. Furthermore, if the
member State consents to the publication of the report, then the CPT's
comments, observations, and recommendations on various penal issues and
policies, which comprise the developing body of standards, will be
disseminated to the member States. This informs the member States about
which measures the CPT considers acceptable and, hopefully, will cause all
member States to conform their practices with the norms expressed in the
CPT's reports. As a result, increased uniformity in the conditions of
confinement among the members' penal facilities should occur. The ECHR
might also prove to provide limited assistance in attaining uniformity. This
would occur through the issuance of the Court's opinions. However, since
the Court primarily addresses discrete issues, as opposed to systemic
inquiries,249 it is doubtful that the ECHR, unlike the ECPT, will result in
the implementation of broad based uniformity.
In contrast, uniformity in the United States is minimal. It exists to the
extent that all states are subject to the limits imposed by the Eighth
Amendment and the other constitutional rights guaranteed to detainees. 2 °
However, unlike the situation in Europe, securing consistency in the
treatment of offenders and their conditions of confinement is not a para-
mount goal in the United States. For example, while the CPT attempts to
establish some degree of regular practice with respect to matters such as the
2' See Jorg Polakiewicz, The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights
in Domestic Law, 17 HUm. RTS. L.J. 401, 405 (1996); see also supra note 114.
247 See supra pp. 28-29 and note 139 (discussing the incorporation of the European Prison
Rules).
28 Carol Mottet, The European Committee For the Prevention of Torture (CPT) As An
International Mechanism of Supervision and Its Interaction With Other Actors of Prevention,
Address in Marly-le-Roi, France (Oct. 25-27, 1996), in MONITORING PRISON CONDITIONS,
supra note 12, at 132, 135.
2'9 The ECPT has the power to exert greater systemic influence because the inspectors
visit a variety of institutions in the member States and examine a variety of diverse factors
in those institutions. See ECPT, supra note 97, at 3 (describing the scope of the inspections).
2o The Eighth Amendment forbids infliction of cruel and unusual punishments on
inmates. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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maximum number of people permitted in various sized cells, the appropriate
cell sizes, nutritional needs, sufficient bed linens, outdoor exercise time,
access to attorneys, and access to family members, there is a conspicuous
lack of uniformity on these and other related issues in the United States."~
These concerns are integral to ensuring the adequacy of conditions of
confinement and are among those addressed in the European Prison
Rules 2 2 and considered by the ECPT" 3 when conducting inspections and
formulating unitary standards through the recommendations contained in the
reports.
The most striking difference that this comparative evolutionary examina-
tion reveals is that presently the United States has regressed with respect to
creating and respecting the rights of prisoners. This is exemplified by the
present use of the "modified hands-off' approach to assess prisoners' rights.
In sharp contrast, Europe has in a multitude of forms repeatedly expressed
its commitment to continue improving the status of those who are confined
and their conditions of confinement. The restructuring of the ECHR through
the implementation of a single Court to facilitate the timely resolution of
disputes between prisoners and prison officials, the possibility that the
European Prison Rules will become mandatory, and the continued improve-
ments that have resulted from the deployment of the ECPT's tools are
representative of this objective. 254
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the recent parallels in incarceration trends and similarities in their
historical development, the United States and Europe differ tremendously
with respect to how matters pertaining to the penally detained are prioritized
and handled.
25' There are professional correctional associations, such as the American Correctional
Association, which prepare guidelines on these issues. See STANDARDS FOR ADULT
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (ACA ed., 3d. ed. 1990); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS (ABA 2d. ed. 1983). These guidelines, however, are
not mandatory or legally enforceable. Nor can they be informally imposed through "moral
suasion" tactics.
252 See European Prison Rules, supra note 98.
253 See ECPT, supra note 97, at ch. III, art. 10, para. 1.
254 See Rod Morgan, Convention Improves European Prisons, OVERCROWDED TIMES, Dec.
1993, at 1 (examining improved prison conditions in Europe as a result of the ECPT); see
also Mottet, supra note 248, at 135.
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In the years immediately following World War II, Europe and the United
States both began to usher in positive changes with respect to the status and
treatment of prisoners. Initially, Europe, however, surpassed the United
States by instituting more substantive alterations. Eventually the United
States followed suit and began to assertively implement positive alterations.
Presently both the United States and Europe are besieged by burgeoning
prison populations which tax human and financial resources. Despite this
circumstance, Europe maintains its commitment to pursue its progressive
course of action and plans to continue improving the conditions of confine-
ment and to impose additional "duties and obligations" on prison officials.
The United States, on the other hand, opted to follow an alternative path
and now has assumed a regressive posture that threatens to severely
compromise the improvements in the status of prisoners and their rights that
took decades to obtain. This outcome is partially due to the fact that the
creation, expansion, and enforcement of the rights of prisoners has almost
entirely required the judiciary's involvement. Therefore, if this governmental
body's philosophy becomes non-receptive to prisoner issues, then there is an
increased risk that prisoners' rights will be curtailed and their status
diminished. This risk is minimized in Europe because a variety of legal
bodies, executive, legislative and judicial, were, and remain, actively
committed to developing and implementing legal instruments designed to
benefit prisoners.
In the end, for whatever the reason, Europe, unlike the United States, has
opted to forge ahead in a positive manner. Prisons will continue to be
inspected, prison administrators will acquire additional duties and obligations,
and access to the courts will continue to improve in order to resolve disputes
more efficiently. This pattern remains consistent with that first historical
step taken by Europe after World War II. Unfortunately, the United States
has selected to take a course of action that partially resurrects dismal past
eras in the annals of the evolution of prisoners' rights. This is a negative
reflection on the United States because:
[i]f you look at prison development as a cultural indicator, then of
course you can't run the prison policy in one direction and the rest of
[Vol. 27:1
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cultural development in another. You must reflect on what sort of
society you want to belong to, what sort of representation of society
it is when it develops in different directions.255
Comparatively, Europe has adopted this credo and the recent prisoners' rights
activity in the United States evidences a retreat from the previously
articulated commitment to embrace it.
2 Nils Christie, Problems of Imprisonment In the World Today, Address in Marly-le-Roi,
France (Oct. 25-27, 1996), in MONITORING PRISON CONDITIONS, supra note 12, at 33.
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APPENDIX A
In 1965 several inmates incarcerated at the Arkansas State Penitentiary
objected to the prison's use of a leather whip' to punish them for violating
the prison's rules.2 The plaintiffs lodged a complaint asserting that using
the whip violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against the "infliction
of cruel and unusual punishments."3 The District Court disagreed with the
plaintiffs and held that whipping as a form of corporal punishment did not
amount to cruel and unusual punishment . Given that the decision was
rendered in 1965 this outcome is not surprising. At this time, judges
remained compelled to obey the prevailing "hands-off' approach of resolving
prisoner complaints, which mandated deferring to the prison officials'
"expertise",' especially in disciplinary and security matters. Interestingly,
despite the formal display of deference to the correctional authorities'
discretion, the court did manifest a conviction that this local interest, to some
degree, had to be considered in conjunction with the. burgeoning acknowl-
edgment that prisoners retained some rights. This is exhibited in the court's
decision to require prison officials to develop and implement "appropriate
safeguards" for using the whip.' In terms of moving away from the leading
"hands-off' approach, this ruling represents a step, albeit slight and hesitant,
towards altering the traditional approach.
A strap, or lash, was used to administer corporal punishment. It was made of leather
and was between four and five feet long and approximately four inches in diameter. The
leather was braided and attached to a six inch wooden handle. "The strap is about one-fourth
inch thick at the end attached to the wooden handle and is gradually tapered toward the end
which comes in contact with the person being whipped." Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp.
804, 809 (E.D. Ark. 1967), vacated, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). See Talley v. Stephens,
247 F. Supp. 683, 687 (E.D. Ark. 1965). Typically, inmates received a maximum of ten
lashes. See Jackson, 268 F. Supp. at 810. In addition to inflicting psychological harm it also
caused physical injuries. See id. at 810-11.
2 See Talley, 247 F. Supp. at 689 (attacking the use of the whip in Arkansas prisons as
cruel and unusual punishment because it was used without appropriate safeguards).
3 See id. at 687-89.
4 See id. at 689.
5 See id. at 686 ("convicts must be disciplined, and prison authorities must be given wide
latitude and discretion in the management and operation of their institutions, including the
disciplining of inmates").
6 See id. at 689.
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Slightly stronger efforts to remove the chains imposed by the traditional
approach surfaced two years later in Jackson v. Bishop,7 another case
challenging the constitutionality of using the whip and other methods of
administering corporal punishment at the same Arkansas penal institution.8
In Jackson, the court's outrage at "the brutal and sadistic atrocities which
were uncovered" 9 at the prison revealed the continuation of the battle being
fought to strip the "hands-off' approach of its legitimacy. However, the
court also stated that it was hindered by the "settled doctrine that except in
extreme cases the courts may not interfere with the conduct of a prison."'
Despite the expression of these formal reservations that complied with the
party line, the court did permanently enjoin the prison officials from
employing the "teeter board"" and the "Tucker telephone"' 2 to administer
corporal punishment.' 3  However, to avoid being accused of reaching a
decision that failed to sufficiently accommodate the state's interest, the court
refused to hold that the use of the whip was per se unconstitutional. 4 In
what amounted to a compromise, the court enjoined prison officials from
using the whip to administer corporal punishment until "additional rules and
regulations are promulgated with appropriate safeguards."' 5
The Jackson court's actions accurately convey the tension that existed
between the traditional "hands-off' approach, which discouraged involvement
by the judiciary, and the emerging "rights enforcement" approach, which
focused on the identification and enforcement of the rights of the incarcerat-
7 268 F. Supp. at 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
8 Id. (alleging that use of any form of corporal punishment, including the "hide," violates
the Eighth Amendment).
9 Id. at 815.
10 Id. (quoting Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 1965)).
" The "teeter board" was an especially harsh form of punishment as it was physically
exhausting and caused severe aches and pains. It required an inmate to stand on a long board
and balance himself by rocking on the nails and a smaller board. See id. at 810 n.7.
2 The "Tucker telephone" was a torture device. A hand-cranked telephone was used to
deliver electrical shocks to "various sensitive parts of an inmate's body." Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678, 682 n.5 (1979); Jackson, 268 F. Supp. at 812.
13 See Jackson, 268 F. Supp. at 816.
14 See id. at 808, 815.
"S See id. at 815. It should be noted that prison officials had been previously charged to
perform this task in the earlier litigation about the constitutionality of using the strap to inflict
punishment. See Talley, 247 F. Supp. at 689. However, the prison officials had not yet, as
required, sought judicial approval of the regulations governing the administration of corporal
punishment. See Jackson, 268 F. Supp. at 808.
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ed and necessarily required the judiciary's presence. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did not consider itself similarly constrained
and proceeded to vacate the portion of the Jackson decision upholding the
strap's constitutionality. 6 Although the appellate court's opinion paid the
requisite lip service to the "hands-off' approach, the decision to vacate
marked the court's recognition that the demise of the "hands-off' doctrine
loomed on the horizon. The reviewing court's statement that it had "no
difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the use of the strap in the
penitentiaries of Arkansas is punishment which, in this last third of the 20th
century, runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment"' 7 communicates this
acknowledgment.
A year later the federal judiciary was presented with yet another complaint
about the Arkansas prison system.'8 This time the complaint contested the
constitutionality of several conditions of confinement in units housing the
general population and segregation inmates. 9 While only one year had
passed since the governing appellate court had adopted an aggressive stance
by refocusing the perspective of the inquiry onto the enforcement of the
rights of the detainees, the trial court in Holt I declined to act similarly and
pursued a more restrictive means of resolving the matter.20 Evidence of the
court's unwillingness to participate in the campaign towards the installation
of the "rights enforcement" phase is exhibited by its contention that
"devising a remedy in this case is both difficult and delicate."2 ' The
"delicacy" referred to is the court's reluctance to develop a remedy which
would actively enforce the inmates' rights at what it considered to be the
expense of retreating from the traditional deference afforded to prison
officials. A year later, however, the situation assumed a radically different
posture.
The year 1970 not only signaled the beginning of a new decade, but for
the prisoner plaintiffs in Holt I, it marked the beginning of the "rights
enforcement" era which would enable them to obtain relief. In contrast to
16 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 581 (8th Cir. 1968).
17 Id. at 579.
'8 See Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) [hereinafter Holt I].
'9 See id. at 826.
20 The court only found in favor of the plaintiffs on their claim that the prison's unsafe
environment constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 300 F. Supp. at 828.
21 Id. at 833 (emphasis added).
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the situation in Holt 1, the plaintiffs in Holt I 22 successfully argued that the
conditions of confinement of the Arkansas prison system were unconstitu-
tional.23 Without hesitation, the court decided that the conditions were
indeed constitutionally impermissible. 24 It also adamantly insisted that
prison officials institute the necessary changes in a timely fashion.25 More
importantly, as an incentive to immediately remedying the constitutional
deprivations, the court threatened to close the prison farms "[u]nless the
conditions at the Penitentiary farms are brought up to a level of constitution-
al tolerability. 26 The willingness to embrace this uncompromising stance
exemplifies how the focus had drastically switched from one of totally blind
deference to one of guaranteeing that the rights of prisoners were properly
considered and when appropriate, as was the case here, given priority over
the prison officials' interests. This configuration represents the central tenet
of the "rights enforcement" era.
22 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affid and remanded, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971)
[hereinafter Holt It].
2 The Court noted that "[tihis case, unlike earlier cases... amounts to an attack on the
System itself." Id. at 365.
24 See id.
25 See id. at 383.
26 id.
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